Yugoslav Ideology: The truth of “Yugoslavism” XIII/XV

By Jovan Dučić

First published in Amerikanski Srbobran, 1942

XIII

We will not discuss “Yugoslavism” during the time of the Yugoslav state.

Everyone knows that during the 23 years of living jointly, there was no peace in that state, and an entire period passed in wasting time, unnecessary and unworthy struggles, humiliations that no nation voluntarily endured, and, finally, bloodshed that will never be erased. Among the Serbs, no one understood what significant reason there was for these trials, for the Serbian people who emerged from the wars of 1912 to 1918 as the victors over three enemies, who had to conclude three peace treaties with them based on the principle: vae victis. It was up to the Serbs to create state borders for themselves in such a way that they would encompass 2/3 of the territory of the former Yugoslavia! And that this state of a United Serbdo could not be denied ethnically or historically!

Based on Strossmayer’s “yugoslavism”, Serbia included Croatia, more than one-third passive, in the common state; Dalmatia, which was entirely passive; a sea border of a full 1,000 kilometers in length; and on land, almost twice as much! Without any particular gain for themselves. And with all moral and worst consequences. To finally come to the Croatian betrayal on the front and the massacre of the Serbian nejač¹…

And before all this, the capitulation on August 25, 1939.

We believe that with this writing of ours, we have especially affirmed that the idea of a common state between Serbs and Croats was either entirely impossible, alongside the historical memories they had had among themselves for centuries, or at least too early by a whole century, very little and inadequately prepared, perhaps even improvised in the enthusiasm of the victories achieved in Serbia; and in the despair of Croatia, after the catastrophe of all its centuries-old ideals: after the destruction of the Habsburg monarchy. We have already emphasized elsewhere: the State is, above all, a spiritual concept and a spiritual creation; therefore, if the state is not national, representing the product of national ideology, it is just a large enterprise, but not a state.

Thus, “Yugoslavism” was for the Croats the epitome of Orthodoxy, Balkanism, and Cyrillic script; and for the Serbs, it was the antithesis of Serbianhood, betrayal, and renegadism towards all the great traditions of St. Sava: the Nemanjić idea of the unity of State, Nation, and Church in one and the same moral concept… For the Croats, “Yugoslavism” was a Great Serbian trap, a political perversion, a Balkan plot against the Catholic Church, Croatian State rights, Western culture, and the sense of order and legality. The legality that the Croatian people knew, although often humiliated, in the Habsburg monarchy, which still represented one of the most perfect administrations and exemplary justice in European history.

To make the Yugoslav State, it was necessary to create the Yugoslav People and have a Yugoslav language. But the Croats were very nationally exclusive, and the Serbs were too rich in their tradition of a great state and empire, which had been the prime state in the Balkans at times; and with their national culture, medieval literary life, painting, poetry; they were intoxicated by recent victories, which had celebrated them all over the world. And they called the language Serbian and Croatian by others. Considering mutual centuries-old intolerance, religious differences, cultural mentality, such leveling and amalgamation could not be imagined as achievable, especially through such unexpectedly unprepared, and even unforeseen, state unification.

Croatian leaders boycotted the establishment of the Vidovdan Constitution, which could have given them all the rights they wanted. It was already well known that they had once had a so-called minister without a portfolio in Pest, and in Belgrade, they had the right to have their six ministers in every government, even with portfolios… In one government, in Davidović’s government at the very beginning, the Croats immediately had their seven ministers!… Then they had the President of Parliament, a Croat, which was equivalent to the rank of the prime minister. Anyway, there was no law for a Croat not to become the head of the cabinet. There was a struggle over bureaucratic positions in Belgrade, but only among candidates; otherwise, no government ever made a quota or questioned where a particular official came from. The game only stopped when Zagreb went entirely to a war footing against Belgrade. Indeed, no blame can be placed on Belgrade for being selfish in the first few years. The glass that Zagreb politicians looked through was tainted, and things looked unclean even when there was nothing of the sort. However, if the boycott against the state was not implemented on the basis of such a crucial issue, such as positions, Radić’s propaganda would not have taken over all circles of local society so quickly. The Croats knew this well.

The third element in the state, the Slovenes, also held onto their national individuality as much as the others. Their first concern was to emphasize that their language, the language of writers like Cankar and Župančič, was not a dialect of Serbian or Croatian but a distinct national speech.

They then created their own university, which they did not have before, and later an Academy of Sciences. All of this was done so as not to be submerged in the idea of “Yugoslavism,” which was talked about so much. Because of this, the Slovenes were considered an example of particularism, valuing it more than binding themselves. In the bloody game between Serbs and Croats during the 23 years of the Yugoslav state, these cultural, peaceful, and positive Slovenes remained true to themselves, not interfering in the dispute, not calling Serbs brothers, and especially never calling Croats brothers (who, on the contrary, consider Slovenes “mountain Croats”). The Slovenes remained among us for 23 years almost more like honest partners in a joint business than a third brother in a common family.

In recent years, “Yugoslavism” seemed like a ministerial and regime idea. Many acts of violence and lawlessness were committed in its name. It took on the appearance of more official patriotism of dictatorial regimes than representing the essence of conscientious and enlightened citizenship. It became more of a political measure and duty than a national perspective and conviction. “Yugoslavism” became a commodity for certain cliques, had its market, stock exchange, speculators, and stockbrokers. The authorities defended it relentlessly even when no one attacked it anymore or particularly sought to exploit it! Since the day “Yugoslavism” became the doctrine of various regimes, it has become burdensome and suspicious even for the Serbs, who paid for this utopia with significant national losses and immeasurable shames.

Yugoslavism is an ideology without its ideologist; an ideal that, as we have seen, originated from intrigue; a utopia that suppressed and prevented the idea; a law defended by lawlessness. In our history, Yugoslavism will be synonymous with dictatorship, to which it was closely tied from the first moment.

If the Serbian people willingly accepted the new era in 1918, a new state, and new citizens they knew mostly by hearsay, it was because they believed in their statesmen of that time, who led three victorious wars. However, they did not anticipate how they, too, were deceived in Paris and London, by the intrigues of the Yugoslav Committee of Trumbić and Hinković, which included several Serbian members of low caliber. This committee introduced disorder and disturbance to all Serbian national and racial foundations, with persistence and ruthlessness they received from Croatian members of that circle, much stronger not only in intrigue but also in conviction and direction, as they desired: always choosing the antithesis against the thesis, reaction against action, intrigue against ideals.

But the Serbian people did not know that in the new state, they would become strangers in their own home. In their Slavic and patriarchal understanding of blood and racial ties, they did not believe that they would find themselves among conspirators against all their sacred shrines in that home, among former foreign soldiers, whom they had defeated, who would then slander and dishonor them among European nations among whom they were once great and renowned.

But that’s not all. The Serbian people did not know that with the new and common state, they were taking on obligations that exceeded all their capabilities, and in return, they received nothing from the other two groups in that community. Yugoslavism was a detour and a dead-end, a recklessness, and suicide.

Translated by Books of Jeremiah