PRELUDE TO SARAJEVO: THE SERBIAN QUESTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1878-1914

UDC 949.715″ 1878I1914″:323.22(=861 :439.55)
Original Scholarly Work

Dusan T. BATAKOVIĆ
Institute for Balkan Studies
Belgrade

Abstract: The Serbian question in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the major obstacle to the stabilization of the semi-colonial, repressive and anti-democratic rule of Austria-Hungary. From the occupation after the Congress of Berlin (1878) until the First World War. the politics of systematic suppression of the Herzegovinian and Bosnian Serbs, especially of their freedom of religion, political rights, and cultural development provoked growing national demands. Tins conflict of interests. combined with intensified international crisis in the Balkans directly led to the Austrian-Serbian war in 1914.

The Eastern Crisis (1875-1878) began with the Serbian insurrections in Herzegovina and Bosnia, and was ended with the occupation of these two Ottoman provinces by Austria-Hungary. The period of the Austro-Hungarian administration – from the occupation (1878) and annexation (1908) to the assassination in Sarajevo (1914) – was the period marked by the systematic suppression of the Bosnian Serbs associated with the restriction of their religious, national and civil rights. Their striving for national equality went through three successive stages: 1) the struggle for religious, ecclesiastic and educational autonomy; 2) political organizing and cultural elevation; 3) revolutionary acts based on individual terrorism. The growing discontent of the rural population, the dominant layer of the Serbian society in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the catalyst of the whole movement although in the beginning it was not directly connected with the actions of the political and cultural elite.

From the Insurrection to the Occupation

The outcome of the Eastern Crisis marked the defeat of the almost century-long efforts of the Serbs from either bank of the Drina river to constitute a single Serbian state from the Ottoman provinces with predominantly Serbian population and within ethnically determined boundaries. On several occasions, in spite of unfavorable international circumstances, the insurgents from Bosnia proclaimed the unification with Serbia, and those from Herzegovina – with Montenegro. After the two Serbian principalities declared war on Ottoman Empire, in June and July 1876 the unification with Serbia was proclaimed in four different locations in Bosnia, where the major part of the insurrection army was gathered. The proclamation to the people underlined that the insurgents, as “the only legal representatives of the Serbian land of Bosnia, after so much waiting and with no hope for any help, [we’ decide today to finally break up with the non-Christian government from Constantinople, and desire to share the destiny, whatever it may be, of our kinsmen the Serbs.”¹ The proclamation of the unification of Bosnia with Serbia gave rise to “feast and great joy” among the people, and the insurgents solemnly took an oath to the Serbian Prince MiIan Obrenovic The Montenegrin Prince Nikola was asked by the Herzegovinian insurgents to accept the title of sovereign of Herzegovina.

The defeat of the movement for the unification of Bosnia with Serbia marked a sudden and long lasting break of the policy laid out in Garasanins Nacertanije (1844), which predicted the unification into one single Serbian state of all the Serbian-inhabited Ottoman provinces in Europe. The crushing of the Serbian national movement was held in Vienna as a precondition for the domination in the Balkans and further penetration towards the Near East. The Austrian penetration into the Balkans marked by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the beginning of the “Drang nach Osten” policy. Therefore, the opinion of the older generation of the American historians has kept its validity that the real background of the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, leading to the World War I was in fact the occupation and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.²

At the Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878), on the suggestion of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary was authorized to occupy Bosnia with Herzegovina (51.000 km²). According to an interpretation from Vienna, “the supremacy of the Slavic race, not inclined at all to be just to the others” would be thereby avoided. At the same time, Austria-Hungary was allowed to usher its troops into the northern part of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, the narrow territorial corridor dividing Serbia from Montenegro, thus impeding their unification In the future.³

The resolutions of the Congress of Berlin were strongly opposed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A provisional, Muslim-led government was formed, calling for resistance to the Austro-Hungarian occupation. Islamic extremism prevailed among the Muslims: European costume was forbidden in Sarajevo, and shari ‘ah (Islamic law) was introduced in Mostar.⁴ The Serbs, militarily exhausted by constant fightings during the four years of the insurrection, sporadically tried to offer stronger resistance to the occupation, often in alliance with the Muslims. The main resistance to the occupying forces, however, was made by the Bosnian Muslims, led by the imam and former brigand of Sarajevo – Hadži Lojo: it took the Austrians several months to break down the resistance. In the first phase of the military intervention, commanded by the two generals – von Philippovitch and Jovanovic, and conducted from three directions, the Austro-Hungarian army engaged 72.000 troops, quickly reaching the figure of 160.000. Due to strong Serbian resistance in Bosanska Krajina (region of Banja Luka), lasting for a month after the occupation of Sarajevo (August 19), the Austrian troops were increased to 268. 000 men. The official number of casualties of the occupying army were 5.020 privates and 178 officers. During the Eastern Crisis, Bosnia and Herzegovina lost about 150.000 men, mostly Serbs and Muslims.⁵

Deeply disappointed with the pro-Bulgarian Russian policy, and in exchange for the guarantees to the dynasty and vague promises of an expansion towards the Vardar valley, Prince Mil an Obrenovi c of Serbia signed the Secret Convention (Tajna konvencija) in Vienna in1881. Serbia thereby ‘renounced any form of political engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been the main goal of the Serbian foreign policy from 1804 to 1878. Until the beginning of the 20th century. Serbia was conspicuously absent from Bosnia: Bosnian Serbs were backed up mainly by the political parties of the opposition (Radicals and Liberals) and clerical circles of Belgrade. The Austrophile policy of Milan Obrenovic, as well as the foreign policy of his successor King Aleksandar (1889-1903), was not very popular among the Serbs, traditionally inclining towards Russia and with a strong sympathy for the co-nationals under the foreign rule. King Milan’s policy aroused suspicion even among the leadership of the Progressive Party (Naprcdna stranka), traditionally loyal to the dynasty. Just like King Milan’s main opponents, the Radicals (Narodna radikalna stranka), some of the Pro-
gressists particularly disagreed with hIS policy towards Bosnia, considenng that Milan betrayed the national interest by denying protection and political support to the Herzegovinian and Bosnian Serbs. During Alexander’s rule, Austro-Hungarian envoys in Serbia frequently complained about the Belgrade press, demanding the suppression of any free thought, even of a mere mention of national aspirations. Baron Thornmel, acting as the envoy to Belgrade, carefully marked not only the unsuitable articles, but also the suspicious expressions pointing to national interests. The expressions such as “national aspirations”, “Slavic solidarity”, “repressed brethren”, even the term “Serbdom”, provoked his suspicion, and often protests and demands for ban.⁶ Ser bia was to be absent from Bosnian politics for the next three decades.

“Civilizing Measures”

Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two provinces still formally under the Ottoman sovereignty, were under the provisions of the imperial order of February 22 1880, administred by the Common Ministry of Finance in Vienna. Certain economic measures and the introduction of order into the internal affairs of the provinces made significant changes in this backward society, but achieved only limited succes. A network or railroads and factones was unsignificant compared to a huge network of military garrisons, fortresses and gendarmerie positions.⁷ Significant effort was made in building schools and other cultural institutions, but the results were insufficient. The “civilizing measures” of Austria-Hungary were politically aimed at establishing a viable political system supported by different ethnic communities, which were
to be separated from any political contact with their co-nationals elsewhere, especially in Serbia and Montenegro. The “civilizing measures” which were aimed primarily against the Serbs as a possible political opponents, also severely affected the Muslims who were reluctant to live in a state ruled by a Christian government. The Serbs started to migrate to Serbia, and the Bosnian Muslims to the neighbouring provinces (Kosovo, Macedonia, even Albania), or to remote regions (Anatolia) under the Ottoman rule.

According to the first Austrian census in 1879, the Orthodox Serbs made the relative majority of 496.458 persons out of 1.158.164 inhabitants. The same ratio was registered In 1910: in spite of the migrations (by 1914 some 40.000 Serbs had been displaced), the Serbs had the majority of 825.918 out of 1.898.044 inhabitants, due to their high birth-rate (by the end of the century it reached 35,60 percent in a 87,92 percent-agrarian population), higher than among the Muslims (some 140.000 had been displaced), and the Roman Catholics who were systematically settled (about 230.000 people were settled in Bosnia nad Herzegovina until 1914, mainly Croats, Czechs and Poles).

The absolute majority of the Serbs was recorded in half the territories under Austro-Hungarian rule: in the Bosnian districts – Banja Luka 70,96 percent; Dubica 82,44 percent; Gradiška 71,98 percent; Bosanska Krupa 64,15 percent; Bosanski Novi 76,06 percent: Bosanski Petrovac 78,83 percent; Ključ 66,43 percent; Kotor Varoš 63,49 percent; Maglaj 53,55 percent; Prijedor 59,08 percent; Prnjavor 60,89 percent; Sarajevo 56,06 percent; Glamoč 77, 26 percent; Varcar Vakuf 79,61 percent; Bijeljina 70,57 percent: Vlasenica 64,37 percent; Zvornik 54,78 percent. In Herzegovina, absolute majority was registered in the following districts: Mostar 61,41 percent; Bileća 81,27 percent; Ljubinje 58,40 percent; Nevesinje 73,06 percent, and Trebinje 71,38 percent.⁸

The general conscription decreed for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1881) gave rise to the 1882 insurrection of the Serbs in Herzegovina, in which a vast number of local Muslims took part, aided by Montenegro and the Ottoman government. The insurrection spread across the Neretva river into central and eastern Bosnia, along the Drina river. The leaders of the insurrection were Stojan Kovačević. Djoko Radović and Pero Tunguz. Due to the lack of arms and of a stronger international support, the insurrection was crushed by the 70.000 men strong Austrian troops. The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs considered this insurrection to be “the last cry of the lethally wounded Slavism in the Balkans”. It seems that the insurrection revived the idea among the officials in Vienna (1882-1883), of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the abandonment of dualism.⁹

Contrary to the Muslims, who opposed the new rulers together with the Serbs, the hope rose among the Croats of Croatia-Slavonia that the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was Just a beginning of its union with the Monarchy by including it into Croatia-Slavonia The “scientific” grounds for the Croatian pretensions to Bosma were laid by the historian Tadija Smičiklas in Povijest Hrvatska (“The History of Croatia”, Zagreb 1878), and his example was followed by Vjekoslav Klaić in Atlas za hrvatsku povjesnicu (“The Atlas for Croatian History”, Zagreb 1882). The French consul in Sarajevo L. Moreau reported in summer 1883, recalling his previous despatch from Cetinje “The aspiration to manage Bosma and Herzegovina m conformity with the Croatian idea is not a new concept. It has existed for at least ten years during the first years of the occupation […] Certain plans are known which deal with the forming of a new state [Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia-Slavonia under Habsburgs] that would extend towards the southeast […] but the fact should not be ignored that this plan will be impossible to realize as long as there is a single Serb left [ … ].”¹⁰

The Hunganan nobleman Benjamin Kallay, Common Minister of Finance, an expert for Serbian affairs and formerly a consul in Belgrade (1868-1875), was appointed administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina m 1882. During his consulship in Belgrade, Kallay noticed that “the strongest attraction exists between Serbia and Bosnia. Serbia is the only country with which the Christians of Bosnia would unite, and under whose rule even the Muslims of Slavic origin from Bosnia would feel contented (provided freedom of religion is granted to them).”¹¹ His suggestions to back up the pretentions of Serbia to Bosnia-He rzegovin a, however, were met with reproach by Vienna. As the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was getting nearer, Kallay prepared a memorandum (April 10, 1877) about the future Austro-Hungarian administration. He predicted that the conflict between Islam and Chris- tianity would be of great interest for the future government, and sug- gested that the Muslims should be used as a barrier against the Pan-Slavic tendencies. He therefore suggested that, by opposing the Serbian national movement, Austria-Hungary should support a rap- prochement of Muslims and Roman Catholics; his suggestion was in- cluded in the instructions given to the new authorities after the occupation.¹²

In order to finally isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia, Kallay, influenced by the Hungarian concept of “political nation”, carefully developed the idea of a separate “Bosnian nation”. The bearers of the new identity were to be the Bosnian Muslims, the alleged medieval Bogomil nobility who had retained their pnvileges by convertmg to Islam. In spite of great efforts and systematic propaganda in the political, cultural and educational spheres, the new ideology proclaimed by Kal- lay did not meet the expected response. The entire theory was a far cry from being historically founded: the majority of Bosnian nobility had ceased to exist after the Ottoman conquests, and the Muslims were mainly descendants of the Islamized Serbs or Croats (each Muslim family knows its origins). Kallay’s ideology intended for Bosnia was similar to the one practiced upon the Albanians: the Austrian scholars tried to prove that all three religions in Albania were bound by a common orrigin, as the descendants of the ancient Illyrians.

Kallay believed that the ideology of a Bosnian nation would be accepted by the Roman Catholics, whose national consciousness was not formed yet. Antun Radić, the brother of Stjepan Radić who was to become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka), wrote after his travels through Bosnia in 1899, that he was “in many places sufficiently and unintentionaly convinced that the Croatian name was utterly unknown to the peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹³ On the other hand, travel-writings prior to the 1878 occupation indicate that neither was the national identity of the Muslims clearly profiled in a modem sense, except for an identification with the Ottomans. Johann Roskiewicz wrote in 1868 that “the Muslims on the one side, and the Catholics and Greeks [i.e. the Orthodox Serbs] on the other, are sharply divided from one another in all respects”, and that in the course of time the Bosnian Muslims completely abandoned the unity with their co-nationals and called themselves “the real Turks”.¹⁴ Karl Grubler recorded in 1877 that the Bosnian Muslim “is not merely a Muslim, he is a Turk”.¹⁵ Adolph Strausz emphasized in 1882 that “each gesture, each word, each thought” of the Bosnian Muslim is closely connected with his religion. Although they hold in them their Slavic character, in their religious feeling they “surpass by far all the Islamic nations”. Although not lacking tradition, the name Bošnjak (Bosnian), however, referred solely to the Muslims: according to a Croatian testimony “in Bosnia the Christians must not call themselves Bošnjaks; when one says ‘Bošnjak‘, the Muslims consider themselves only, while the Christians are the Bosnian raya or otherwise Vlachs”.¹⁶

In order to isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia and Montenegro Kallay’s administration introduced differents measures, rangmg from economic to military ones. Imports from Serbia in the early 1880’s amounted to 7,536,028 dinars, and exports to Serbia – 742,017 dinars. In 1885 imports from Serbia dropped to 220,162, and exports – to 48,516 dinars. This trend was maintained m the followmg decades. The trade with Montene- gro bemg unsignificant, Kallay assessed that the ethnic and cultural rela- tions between Herzegovinians and Montenegnns should be cut off by the erection of military fortifications along the border.¹⁷

From 1889 on, the administration introduced into Bosnia-Herzegovina a special red and yellow flag, and coat-of-arms, trying to shape the state symbols of both provinces. The officials (58 percent) were brought from other parts of Monarchy as police officers (in the beginning from Croatia-Slavonia mainly). Into the Serb-inhabited towns along the Dnna river, Roman Catholics were settled, so that the Serbian ethnic continuity would be interrupted along the Bosman border with Serbia. The Jesuits were brought to Bosma in 1881 to strengthen the Roman Catholic influence: they were considered as more militant in their proselytism than the local Franciscans, whose co-operation with the local Serbs and the authorities in Serbia had developed almost harmoniously in previous decades. The Archbishop of Vrhbosna in Sarajevo Josip Stadtler (from 1882) was prominent in arousing discord between Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats, and then be- tween Serbs and Muslims. Despite formal wammgs from the authori- ties, Stadtler did not hesitate to christianize the Muslims, arousing their discontent and the first attempts at political-religious organization. Ro- man Catholics also published several books bearing titles offensive to the Orthodox Serbs,¹⁸ and the persecutions based on national and relig- ious motives often came close to overt racism.

The “Bosnian” language was declared as the official language instead of the Serbo-Croatian, the Cyrillic alphabet was systematically suppressed, and the Serbian schools, the most numerous, were gravely disturbed in their work. Schools were considered important aids in propagating the new Ideology. Kallay’s ideas were expounded m heavily subsidized papers, aimed at inducing Bosnian separatism (Sarajevski list, the official Die Bosnische Post, the Muslim Bošnjak); the importation of the Serbian and partially Croatian newspapers from Montenegro, Vojvcdina, Dalmatia and Serbia was forbidden. Kallay even forbade his own book The History ofthe Serbian People – according to his new criteria, he had written too affirmatively about the Serbs, with knowledge and understanding. The policy of banning newspapers and magazines remained in force even after Kallay’s death in 1903: the number of banned newspapers reached 187 in 1908.¹⁹ Out of this number 134 were published in Belgrade, three in Novi Sad, three in Šabac, two in Niš and one each in Split, Kragujevac, Dubrovnik, Zadar, Sombor etc.

Along with the persecutions of the Serbian national movement, suppression of Serbian Orthodoxy was carried out. Under the convention signed with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople in March 1880, the occupying authorities were given the right to ordain new metropolitans, while the existing four retained their sees. Three metropolitans soon got expelled, and were quickly followed by the fourth, Sava Kosanović. In 1881 the Metropolitan of Sarajevo Sava Kosanović had informed the Serbian government, the Russian Synod and the Ministry in Vienna that a local officer, a certain Graf Christof von Mierszowicze, offered him a large sum of money to accept the Union with Rome, and to recognize the pope as the supreme religious authority. A great scandal broke out. Kosanović submitted a complamt to Vienna agamst the “aggressive Roman Catholicism” and Graf Mierszowicze had to be moved from Bosma. Kosanović entered into a dispute with the local government (Zemaljska vlada) in 1883, in which he emphasized that he was bound by his vows to “educate his subordinates and the people to cherish their religion and to respect the religion of others […] I spread peace, love and harmony and rightfully expected the others to act m the same tolerant and friendly way” Because of his overt resistance to the Roman Catholic proselytism Kosanović came into conflict with Kallay and was forced m 1885 to resign and leave Bosnia for good. The new Orthodox bishops, elected among the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia and Vojvodina, were expected to be loyal to the new authorities. The new bishops, however, could not completely control the lower clergy, loyal only to their religious and national cause.

The sole institutions of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, besides the Church itself, were the communes of religious and educational character. By the end of the 19th century there were 351 of them, but only 42 were active. Some 309 schools under the administration of the local Orthodox priests and teachers were active too. For the Serbs under the foreign rule such communes were a kind of a state within the state. Their work was restricted right after the occupation in 1878: the Serbian requests for the free election of the Orthodox bishops, the use of the Cyrillic alphabet, and the establishment of schools were then answered by repressive measures, arrests and dismissals of school professors, as well as frequent raids on the communes. The Austro-Hungarian authorities systematically disturbed or limited the schooling activities, interfered in the affairs of the Episcopate, Consistory and School of Theology and denied the financial means to the schools, teachers and priests. The Introduction of the Latin alphabet and Croatian dialect of Serbo-Croatian into the Serbian schools aroused great resentment. Latin alphabet was seen by the Serbs as “the essential feature of the Catholicism” and the Croatian dialect as “concealed Catholic propaganda”.²⁰

The complaint of the Serbs from Banja Luka. submitted in 1882, is a good illustration of such feelings: “The judicial and administrative officials who came to this country […] have had no other business but to spread ‘Greater Croatian ideas’ […] as if there were no Serbs in this country. The Cyrillic alphabet is neglected and despised, and the ‘Croatian Latin’ alphabet is forced upon the people as the official one, though the majority of the Bosnian population does not understand it and cannot read it […] Besides the alphabet, our Serbian nationality is also despised and oppressed, especially by minor officials. The officials mainly came to us from Croatia and gladly engaged themselves in spreading ‘Greater Croatian’ ideas among us, the Serbs. instead of fulfilling their duties diligently.”²¹ In 1880, a similar memorandum by the Serbs from Mostar was sent to the Russian Emperor, the traditional protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The Serbs from Mostar were complaining about the suppression of the Cyrillic alphabet and Serbian national rights as well as about police repression.

The National Movement (1896-1905)

Since 1896, with the intellectual support of Serbs from Croatia, Dalmatia and Vojvodina and the government In Belgrade, the move- ment of the Bosnian Serbs for the educational and religious autonomy grew. The Serbs, led by Gligorije Jeftanović, Vojislav Šola, Stjepo Trifković and Kosta Kujundžić, submitted three memorandums to the Emperor Franz Joseph (1896, 1897, 1901) demanding religous and communal autonomy, civil rights, freedom of the press, freedom of gathering, and constitutional protection.²²

Their position is well-illustrated by the first Memorandum of November 5, 1895, signed by the representatives of all major Serbian communes (Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Zvornik, Brčko, Gračanica, Stolac, Doboj, Bosanska Gradiška, Prijedor. Bosanski Novi, Dubica, Sanski Most, and Bijeljina): “Non-Orthodox commissaries attend our meetings and take part in decision-making; they take down by force the sacred icons and historic pictures: they forbid the purchase and transfer of real estate to the religious and educational communes, without prior permission from the political authorities: they disturb religious rites, they violate and change the ceremony of Saint Sava feast: they do not obey the orders concerning the usage of the Cyrillic alphabet In the communes, but Impose the Latin alphabet and Croatisms; they negate the use of the Serbian name and impose by force to the communes the name of the Bosnian language (especially in printed matter for school reports); they forbid the free election of parsons, they chase away and move the priests; they impose fines on the members of the communes and persecute them: the Serbian churches cannot be erected in honorable places, but in less promment ones or even out of the towns; the make-up of church chorus to embellish the liturgy is not permitted (i.e. In Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Gradiška, Brčko): the acceptance of donations and gifts is hampered by the need to obtain political permission; the churches of our Serbian Orthodox communes are managed according to the laws for corporations or political societies, a fact opposed to the canon law; in certain communes, without the consent by the people and the clergy, by-laws are imposed that contradict the regulations of the Orthodox Church and place all the power Into the hands of the police.”²³

Repression over the signatones of the Memorandum followed – interference in their affairs up to the “legal” confiscation of their workshops, licences and estates – and the Serbian merchants were compelled to sign a petition against the Memorandum renouncing its initiative. The Serbian leaders were thus divided into two factions: the larger, so-called “people’s”, and the minor group of “government’s men”. The adjournment of the Serbian commune of Sarajevo In February 1897 was carried out by a visible police repression, and similar actions followed in the other towns: a member of the Serbian communal assembly from Bosanski Novi was condemned to three years of hard labour because he did not invest his authority to prevent local Serbs from going to Orthodox church. He was acquitted by the Supreme Court, but only after a number of petitions.

The second Memorandum to the Emperor (March 1897), which had the support of the Muslims too, was followed by persecutions, dismissals and the resignation of twelve Serbian teachers. Kallay made special efforts, through some clergymen who were loyal to him, to implement the laws that would practically suspend religious and educational autonomy of the Serbs.

After the third Memorandum (May 1900) the protection and intervention of Russia was asked for. In a letter to Pobedonostsev, the representative of the Russian Synod, it was emphasized: “It is almost ten years now that we have been struggling with all of our force for the autonomy of the Church and the national schooling, rights we were entitled to even under the Turks, and the battle is not over yet. The people are losing hope that we might succeed in our actions, if we are not aided by someone stronger and mightier. Our only hope is the help from mighty and brotherly Russia.”²⁴ It was only after the fourth Memorandum (June 5, 1902) that the Austro-Hungarian authorithies accepted to negotiate the new conditions for Serbian communal and ecclesiastic autonomy.

The favoritism enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church was noticed by several foreign travelers: “Complaints are heard that the administration encouraged the settling of the citizens from the Monarchy and thus attempted to change the ratio of the population. It is true that the number of Catholics, a mere 209.391 in 1879, reached 334.112 in 1895, which makes 30 percent of the increase In this period, while the Catholics made only 18 percent of the population in 1879. Trying to be utterly objective as to the development of the Roman Church in Bosnia, which is one of the points especially insisted upon by the Serbs, I have to state that the number of Catholic churches, vastly increased after the occupation, is no doubt higher than the population of that faith needs […] At the moment of occupation there were only 35 Catholic churches; from 1878 to 1906 another 153 were built, while to the number of 235 Orthodox churches in 1878, only 201 new ones were added. In short, if it is impossible to speak about a Germanization of Bosnia, it cannot be denied that the government desires, to a certain extent, the Croatization of the country, and consequently its stronger link to the Monarchy and promotion of a plan certainly worth of attention [.. ] A senous criticism concerns the fact that in the administration of the country almost exclusively officers of the Austrian or Hungarian origin are employed. A young, very educated man from an esteemed Sarajevo family […] complained strongly about such an exclusiveness: all the administrative posts are held by foreigners, the major part of whom, it is true, are the Slavs, Czechs or even Croats: but, in his words, they are more Austrian than the Germans themselves.”²⁵

Albert Maler, well-acquainted with the situation in the Balkans, wrote In a Parisian magazine Revue Bleue: “Austria has made no effort to calm down religious rivalries. Making use of the fact that it is the fervent faith that the nationality originates from, Austria tends to divide the Serbian nation in Bosnia into three nationalities. To the Muslims it says: ‘You are not Serbs, but Bosnians; your language is not Serbian, but Bosnian; you have your history and your laws which have nothing in common with the Christian history and laws.’ To the Catholics, it tells they are Croats. They are rather glad to listen to it, because they enjoy all the benefits. Orthodox Serbs are the only allowed to call themselves Serbs and to speak Serbian. In order to clearly delineate these national distinctions, Austria has started numerous magazines. These are subsidized by Austria, and edited by the police: Bošnjak [The Bosnian] for the Muslims, and Glas Hercegovaca [The Voice of Herzegovinians] for the Catholics.”²⁶

Numerous anonymous reports coming from the Serbs of Bosnia were published in the Belgrade press, denouncing Kallay’s nationalities policy. One of these reports stressed that Kallay’s administration tried to present his rule to the foreign press as enlightened and modern: “In order to justify his acts of obstruction and harassment of our schools, Kallay, through a part of the European press, makes our people appear blinded by the Greater Serbian propaganda and unable to see the real thruth: he depicts our [Serbian] people as barbarians insensitive to any European culture and progress […] How far-fetched and how untruthfully the foreign travellers write about our position in Bosnia […] let us mention […] Houston Stewart Chamberlain who, in his essay La Bosnie sous Ie protectorat de I ‘Autriche. published by ‘La bibliotheque universelle’ in 1892 (vol.14 April-May) speaking about and commending the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina said: ‘Serbs vainly believe that the Latin alphabet is an act of the devil, and will not have their children learn it.’ What savages he makes us appear, and I suppose only because we object against the communal schools where the main alphabet is Latin. It is true that we oppose their forcibly imposing Latin upon us. […] We love what is our own [Cyrillic alphabet], and respect that which belongs to the others.”²⁷

The Bosnian Serbs established co-operation with the autonomist Muslim movement, both having been confronted with the threat of Roman Catholic proselytism. In 1902 the important cultural society of the Serbs was founded in Sarajevo – “Prosvjeta” which, along with “Zora” from Mostar, was the cornerstone of the future struggle for national rights. In 1910, out of 710 cultural societies, as much as 396 were Serbian. Among the others, the Muslim society “Gajret” was also rather important and considered as being pro-Serbian. The political agreement between the Serbian and Muslim leaderships reached in Slavonski Brod in 1902 was envisaged as an attempt at overcoming religious differences between the Serbs of Orthodox and the Muslim faith. Their joint struggle for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Serbian lands was then agreed upon the following issues: “The Serbs of the Orthodox and Muslim faith pledge to act and to call upon the people to act in order that Bosnia and Herzegovina may gain the autonomy under the supreme power of the Sultan”; it was agreed that “the public and official language is Serbian, and the alphabet is Cyrillic.”²⁸ According to this agreement Bosnia-Herzegovina should be administrated by a Muslim and an Orthodox governor in turns, and that all the Roman Catholic orders with the exception the Franciscans should be expelled. In spite of a series of obstructions and persecutions, the Serbian autonomist movement obtained in August 1905, two years after Kallay’s death, the religious and educational autonomy, sought for throughout the previous decades. The plan of creating the separate “Bosnian nation” was thus definitively abandoned. Instead of being named as “Bosnian” or “zemaljski” (meaning: “of the land”), the language was officially named Serbo-Croatian in 1907, despite the attempts to change it into Croato-Serbian.

The new administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stefan von Burian (1903-1911), tried to calm down the conflicts between the authorities and the Serbs by moderating the attitude towards their national rights and the religious emancipation of the Muslims, but the results were modest.²⁹

Kallay’s policy of forcibly imposing the new Bosnian identity did not yield the desired results, but provoked a counter-effect. The French consul in Sarajevo noticed that “to refine the means of oppression does not mean to civilize.”³⁰ The Bosnian Serbs, even without the aid from Belgrade, became more organized and felt stronger solidarity, so they used the new circumstances to establish closer ties with the Serbs in Vojvodina and, to some extent, in Croatia-Slavonia. According to a German interpretation: “The outskirts of Austria became porous. Bosnia, designed to become a barrier against Serbia, became instead the area through which the Serbdom penetrated. Kallay himself admitted the failure of his Bosnian policy and gradually changed it, but it was too late – he died in 1903. One of his last statements was: ‘Le serbisme, voila l’ennemi’.”³¹

The unsolved agrarian question was an additional source of the Serbian discontent. The 1859 edict issued by the Ottoman authorities had been adopted by the Austro-Hungarian administration as a valid legal act. Though stating equal protection of rights for both landowners and serfs, the authorities of occupation actually preserved the Ottoman feudal system. The legislation favoured landowners, the Muslims, and discriminated against the serfs, mostly Serbs.³²

According to the 1910 census, out of the total number of 10,430 landowners with serfs, 9,537 were Muslims. Out of 79,667 serfs, 58,895 were the Orthodox Serbs. These discriminatory measures were then incorporated into the new legal acts. By the order of January 9, 1883, the repartition of the serfs’ farmsteads was forbidden unless the landowner permitted it. Another order (July 19, 1891) specified that the houses and buildings erected by the serfs were not their own property, but the possession of landowners who were to provide a compensation. By the third order (December 8, 1895) the agrarian lawsuits came within the competence of the administration which was protective towards the landowners. For the right of repartition the serfs were compelled to compensate the landowners in the form of a considerable ,gift’. In order to prevent revolts, the administration was giving loans to the serfs to buy their properties since 1884. The results, however, were poor because the serfs were under great obligations both to the state and the Muslim landowners. Unable to pay dues, many serfs lost their estates and were ruined. This was the reason that a true small-scale war was waged between the Serbian serfs and the Muslim land-owners. In 1896 the number of agrarian lawsuits was as high as 133.423, and by 1904 it rose to more than 200.000.³³ Peasant uprisings of 1910, to which the reaction was collective fines for setting land-owners houses on fire, were partially overcome by the Emperor’s law of voluntary redemption (June 13, 1911).³⁴

All the repressive measures against the Serbs proved to be insufficient. The Serbs dominated Bosnia and Herzegovina not only by demographic growth (being mostly a rural population, they had the highest birth rate), but also in economic strenght. Although the town were predominantly Muslim-inhabited, the entreprising layer of merchants, under the constrained circumstances, was made up mostly of Serbs. One of the wisest Austrian statesmen, Dr. J. M. Baemreither, came to the conclusion that the Bosnian Serbs were “the richest, the most vigorous and the most capable for business in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.³⁵

The development of banking institutions clearly showed the rise of Serbian economy. The first Serbian monetary institution was founded in Mostar (Serbian bank-Srpska banka), and it was followed by the Serbian Credit Fund (Srpski kreditni zavod) in Banja Luka in 1905, the Serbian Commercial Bank (Srpska trgovinska banka) in Brčko, Serbian Savings-Bank (Srpska štedionica) in Prijedor. The next year, Serbian savings-banks were opened in Bijeljina and Livno; the Serbian Credit Bank and Savings-Bank in Tuzla and the Serbian Credit Fund (Srpski kreditni zavod) in Bosanska Gradiška were founded in 1907, a Serbian savings-bank was opened in Bosanska Dubica in 1908, a Serbian Bank and savings-bank in Trebinje in 1910, another six banks in 1911, and finally the Serbian Central Bank was set up in Sarajevo in 1912.³⁶

Although the prevailing majority of the Serbs in Bosnia was the agrarian population, by the beginning of the 20th century 17 out of 19 millionaires in Sarajevo were Serbs. According to the census of 1910, there were 1.898.044 inhabitants; out of this number, 825.418 were Orthodox, 612.137 Muslims and 434.061 Catholics (mainly Croats, but also Czechs, Poles and Germans). The number of Muslims kept decreasing due to low birth rate and constant emigration to Turkey. The authorities feared that the Orthodox Serbs would gradually gain dominance in Bosnia, so they kept settling a new Roman Catholic population for the needs of their economy, bureaucracy and police apparatus. In 1910 there were 124.591 persons without Bosnian citizenship, and by 1914 some 180.000 people had been settled there. About 140.000 persons, exclusively Serbs and local Muslims, were compelled to emigrate under pressure, economic or political, to Serbia or Turkey.³⁷

In Austria-Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a status similar to that of a colony. The development of the occupied provinces was not much worked on: the efforts were aimed at exploiting the resources; roads and railroads were built, so that the raw materials from the mines and forests could be easily transported to their final destination. The agrarian question was unsolved, and only 14,33 percent of the children were included into the educational system as late as 1908. In his story “Jazavac pred sudom” (‘A Badger before the Court’, 1903) agrarian leader and famous writer Petar Kočić ridiculed the authorities and through the character of a seemingly naive peasant denied that Franz Joseph was his emperor; he wondered if “at least an average emperor may be carved out of the Serbian king or the Montenegrin prince, since we, the Serbs, have felt like having an emperor for a long time.”

The discontent with the Austro-Hungarian administration was well understood by count Agenor von Goluchowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy, who gloomily concluded in 1903: “In spite of the efforts of Mr Kallay and his engaged optimism, no one in this country hides the fact that the Austrian influence has not made a single step forward in the occupied provinces and that [Austria-Hungary] has not gained any popularity.”³⁸ The officials brought to Bosnia-Herzegovina often had unsufficient training, as they originated mainly from the lower military echelons, With inadequate or none whatsoever knowledge of the language, the foreign officials acted rudely and arrogantly, thus inducing great agitation and constant animosity, In 1904, 34,5 percent of the officials m Bosnia-Herzegovina had come from Austria, 38,29 percent from Hungary, and solely 26,48 percent were natives, mainly Croats. In 1907, among 32,22 percent of officials of domestic origin, 61,6 percent were Roman Catholics, 29,94 percent were Orthodox and only 8,6 percent Muslims. The authorities and the subjects were on stiff and strictly official terms. The natives of all the three national groups were usually considered by the officials from Hungarian or Austrian parts of the Monarchy as dummer Bosniak. Iso Kršnjavi, a Croatian politician, recorded that the dissatisfaction of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could be described as “commotion”, should not be interpreted only as the result of political agitation from Serbia: “To a much greater extent it is the consequence of the errors committed in Austria-Hungary.”³⁹

On the occasion of the first relatively free local elections, both Serbs and Muslims unfurled the same slogan against the foreigners; “Fuori lo straniero!” was the cry which, as in the times of Mazzini in Italy, united the two groups. Only the Croatian clericals in Bosnia showed enthusiasm for the Monarchy. Gathered around the Archbishop of Sarajevo, Stadtler, they argued in a number of articles published in 1906-1907 in the newspapers Hrvatski dnevnik (The Croatian Daily) that, after the annexation, Bosnia and Herzegovina should be united with Croatia.⁴⁰ After the enactment of a somewhat more liberal law on the freedom of the press (1907). the Serbian papers, trying to aVOId the accusations for their connection with Serbia, argued for autonomy as a possible solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and pru- dently accepted the terminology of the Muslim papers referring to the Emperor in Vienna as “the provisional mandatary of the European powers to admmistrate Bosnia and Herzegovina”. and emphasizing that both provinces were constitutive parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The Serbian political body was divided in three factions. The elder generation of the Serbian moderate politicians in Bosnia, gathered around the papers Srpska riječ (Serbian Word) in Sarajevo (founded in 1905). The younger generation, mostly the former Vienna students, gathered around the strictly national papers Otadžbina (Fatherland) from Banja Luka (founded in 1907) and Narod (Nation) from Mostar (founded also in 1907), which wrote about Austria-Hungary as the “neighboring Monarchy”. Until a faction from Banja Luka strongly emphesized the social problems of the peasants, Narod cherished the national and cultural elevation.

The Bosnian Serbs tried to organize their struggle for national rights similarly to the other Slavic peoples within the Monarchy – through the press, political parties and organizations and, very limit- edly, through the Parliament (the Bosnian Assembly, promised in 1908, began to work as late as 1910, but because the narrow franchise it could not truly reflect the political situation). In the first article of the programme of the Serbian National Organization (Srpska Narodna Or- ganizacija, 1907), whose leaders were elected by the general vote, it was emphasized as the basic principle that “every nation has its right to self-determination”.⁴¹

The cultural initiatives of the Monarchy – from the foundation of cultural institutions with prominently Bosnian, regional character, to the starting of the new scientific reviews and the publishing of strikingly luxurious volumes in which the historical, philological and literary independence of Bosnia- Herzegovina was glorified – were all motivated by an ultimately political aim: to create a regional cultural center as the counterweight to the increasing cultural influence from Belgrade, with which the intelligentsia of the Bosnian Serbs established close cooperation. Soon enough the Serbian papers uncovered the political motive of such an orientation of the scientific institutions: “The luxuriously furnished and illustrated volumes with the contents of scientific value, the commissioned scientific excursions, the congresses of scholars all over Glasinac and Ilidža, all these are the manifestations of the mercenary role imposed to science by the police.”⁴²

Austria-Hungary and Serbia: The Conflict Reopened (1903-1908)

The 1903 military coup brought to Serbia, along with the dynasty of Karadjordjević back to the throne, a new attitude in foreign affairs. The period from 1903 to 1914 was marked by Serbia’s return to the policy laid out in the Načertanije of Ilija Garašanin, but modified to concur with the new circumstances in international relations: the activation of the struggle for the national unification through an independent foreign policy. Reliance on the Western democracies, France and Great Britain, as opposed to the growing German influence, was managed through Russia, in which the Serbs saw a natural ally, traditional champion of Slavic and Orthodox interests in the Balkans. The raising of the Serbian question in the south as well (the problem of the forthcoming allocation of the Balkan provinces still under Ottoman rule in Old Serbia and Macedonia), together with the solution to the further destiny of the Serbs and South Slavic peoples within the Habsburg Empire, led to the overt conflict with Austria-Hungary.

The rivalry with die Monarchie, dual by the bearers of power and multiethnic in its structure (47.100.000 inhabitants, compared to 2.600.000 Serbs in Serbia, and almost 7.000.000 Serbs, Croats and Slovenes within the Monarchy), ran along several parallel planes, Bosnia-Herzegovina not being the primary issue in the beginning.

Political circles in Vienna planned to solve the growing rivalry between the Austrian and Hungarian political elites by territorial expansion and the annexation of the adjacent Slavic states. Through an increase of the Slavic population within the Empire, the new possibilities for a tripartite structure of the state would emerge, in which the struggle of the Hungarian and Slavic elites would Install supremacy of the German part of the Empire – Austria.

For Vienna, a war in the Balkans – against Serbia – would mean an internal purification and the first precondition of the internal con- solidation of the Monarchy; it was referred to as a “cleaning with an iron broom”. For Austria-Hungary, which could not keep pace with the economic growth of the other European powers, the strengthening of national movements inside its borders was a twofold danger: firstly, the possibility of the whole Empire falling apart, further diminishing its Austrian and Hungarian territories, and secondly, the possibility of a social revolution endangering the power of the domineering layer of landed aristocracy. Becoming more and more dependent on Germany, which in turn tended to make Austria its satellite, and at the same time endangered by its ally, Italy, whose considerable minority lived within the borders of the Habsburg state, Austria-Hungary was compelled to solve the internal problems by further penetration into the Balkans.⁴³

For Serbia, the process of gaining political and military independence began, as advised from St. Petersburg, by commissioning cannons for the army from the French firm “Schneider-Creusot”, although Austria-Hungary did it best to make its firm “Skoda” or the German concern “Krupp” obtain the commission. The reply from Vienna to the Serbian challenge was the five-year long customs tariff conflict (1906-1911), known as the “Pig War”. However, by using Salonika port for export, the Serbian economy successfully resisted the Austrian blockade, although till then 66 percent of the import and 93 percent of the export had depended heavily on the Hungarian and Aus- trian markets. A few years later only 41 percent of the Serbian trade was controlled by the Monarchy.⁴⁴

The Road to Annexation

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 6, 1908, its formal inclusion into Austria-Hungary on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the reign of Franz Joseph, was preceded by elaborate consultations within the military circles of the Monarchy.⁴⁵ As early as 1907 the evaluation began in Vienna as to the future relations with Serbia. In the summer of 1908 a plan was completed about the total destruction or Serbia as “the revolutionary nest” and the division of its territory between the Monarchy and Bulgaria. The possible allotment of territories to Romania and Albania (after its formation in 1912) was also considered. In Budapest it had been suspected for some years (1908-1909, 1912, 1913, and in July 1914) that the intention of Vienna to wage a war with Serbia was aimed at undermining the position of Hungary in the Monarchy. For the Hungarian elite a better solution was the establishing of the protectorate over formally independent but territorially diminished and politically neutralized Serbia. The Young Turk revolution in July 1908 additionally accelerated the preparations for the annexation.

The annexation of Bosma-Herzegovina was the consequence of the interior and exterior political needs of Austria-Hungary. The beginning of the political collaboration between the Serbs and the Croats in Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia (Croato-Serbian Coalition), the Serbian national movement for the religious and educational autonomy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the analogous movement of the Bosnian Muslims. gave rise to fears that the further development of the movement for the Serbian union might make the idea of Serbia as the Piedmont appealing to the South Slavic peoples of the Monarchy.

Count Aehrenthal. the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained to the German government, in the autumn of 1908. the logics of the Vienna policy: “With the weakening of Turkey and its expulsion into Asia, the process of state rearrangment has begun agam on our southeastem frontiers. As we had to resume the attitude towards the fact, thirty years ago it was solved by the occupation and this time it is annexation. These two acts meant the destruction of the dream about a Greater Serbian state between the Danube, Sava and the Adriatic. It need not be emphasized that this new factor, if it existed, would be directed from the outside, from the northeast and west, and there- fore would not be an element contributing to the peaceful develop- ments in central Europe. In such a decisive phase of our state reorganization which. from our point of VIew. should be more accu- rately denoted as ‘the development of the Reich’, one must. if nothing else helps, think about the implementation of the ultima ratio in the life of a nation.”⁴⁶ AehrenthaI left the plan about the war with Serbia, thoroughly worked out in Vienna, for the next phase: the way to Salonika led over conquered Serbia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy planned to make Serbia harmless by war and to impose upon it a high amount of war reparations – 500 million francs. While Serbia would be paying the reparations for many years. the Monarchy would retain the governing of Belgrade as a guarantee.

The Preparationsfor the Annexation: the Trial for High Treason in Zagreb

The public in the Monarchy was prepared for the annexation by a fabricated trial in 1908-1909 in Zagreb. Fifty three Serbian politicians were accused of conspiring against the Monarchy in collaboration with the Belgrade government. In the spring of 1908, Aehrenthal ordered the Croatian ban (local governor) Pavao Rauch to collect evidence about the disloyal Serbs who would then be accused for high treason in the right moment. The unavoidable nature of the forthcoming annexation of BosniaHerzegovina was to be explained to European public by the “evidence” for the anti-state propaganda waged by the Serbs and, if needed, the Croats of Yugoslavist stance. For Croatia-Slavonia, it meant a struggle against the Croato-Serb Coalition which. in spite of the pressure exercised by the authorities, had gained victory one more time, so that in March 1908 the ruler dismissed the Croatian Assembly and imposed absolutism. The Croatian newspaper Ustavnost threatened the Serbs that they might meet the same pogroms as before in Zagreb in 1902, i.e. persecutions and executions. The target of all the attacks was the Serbian Independent Party (Srpska samostalna stranka), slandered for the alleged “Greater-Serbian propaganda”. Firstly, in 1908 planted posters appeared in Kostajnica containing an appeal to the Serbs to rise and offences to the imperial family. Before the charges were brought, from August 1908 to the end of the year the arrests of the Serbs took place, most commonly based on denouncinations by different persons, such as Roman Catholic parish priests and the followers of the Pure Party of Rights (Čista stranka prava) led by Josip Frank.⁴⁷

When the annexation was publicly announced on October 7, 1908, the Zagreb prison became filled up with Serbs. The arrested “traitors” were then spectacularly led in chains through Zagreb. The accused were the leaders of the Serbian Independent Party, among them Adam and Valerijan Pribićević, brothers of Svetozar Pribićević, the leader of the Coalition. Among the traitors were 14 merchants, 12 teachers, 9 civil servants, 6 landowners, 5 priests, 3 craftsmen, 2 physicians, one professor and one student. The trial in which 31 men were convicted, was held immediately before the elections, in order to break the Croato-Serb Coalition. The charges were based upon the statute of a ephemere Serbian revolutionary organization which argued for a Yugoslav republic (and not a monarchy under the King Petar I Karadjordjević as it was stated in the charges). The main “evidence” was drawn from a brochure (pamphlet Finale) written by Djordje Nastić, an agent of the Vienna government.⁴⁸ The organization “Slavic South” (Slovenski jug) from Belgrade was also accused. The charges were expected to prove that there wer no Serbs (about 25 percent of the population) in Croatia-Slavonia, and that their existence was amy the product of an obstinate propaganda by the Serbian Orthodox Church and the nationalistic propaganda from Serbia.

The defendants were accused of proclaiming the Serbian name, spreading the Cyrillic alphabet and bearing Serbian flags, of founding banks, bearing the Serbian coat-of-arms, although none of this was illegal. The theory of their alleged origins from the Vlachs was revived, but it was persuasively refuted by the historians Radoslav Grujić from Vojvodina and Ljubomir Kovačević from Serbia.⁴⁹ Many lawyers – 38 in all – were willing to defend the defendants, among them 21 Croats, mainly of Yugoslavist orientation. The Pribićevć brothers were defended by a Croat Hinko Hinković, a member of the Parliament from the Croato-Serbian Coalition. The Czech leader Thomas G. Masaryk conducted a investigation in Zagreb and Belgrade on the statements in the “indictment” and stood in defence of the accused. Masaryk required that the Austrian Parliament urgently investigate the allegations about a revolutionary movement in the south of the Monarchy and submit a report. At the same time, he convincingly proved that some of the documents were forged by the translator of the Austro-Hungarian legation in Belgrade, who made heavy mistakes.⁵⁰ The Dalmatian Assembly also took the side of the accused. A resolution was adopted against the indictment: the statement that “the Serbian revolutionaries were in correspondence with accomplices in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik” was “refuted with indignation and angrily we protest against the persecutions of the Serbs in Croatia and Dalmatia”.⁵¹ In the Hungarian diet in Budapest, on behalf of the Serbian deputies, Mihailo Polit-Desančić stressed: “That trial for high treason in Croatia is closely connected to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, on the other hand, it is also connected to the consolidation of the posture of the actual ban [.. ] This is tyranny”⁵² The trial stirred up the public In Europe as well, especially the French League for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights.⁵³ The trial became pointless when Vienna gave up the plan to wage war against Serbia. The convicted were abolished by the decree of Emperor Franz Joseph I.

The second attempt to discredit the cooperation between the Croats and the Serbs proved to be futile during the second trial Inspired by Aehrenthal at the moment when the war with Serbia still seemed to be inevitable. On his initiative, the Vienna historian Heinrich Friedjung was to bring forth the “evidence” about the subversive actions of the Serbian government among the South Slavs, so that the attack upon Serbia could be Justified. This was planned to discredit both the Serbian government and the Coalition, on the basis of forged documents Friedjung obtained through an employee of the Austrian legation In Belgrade. After the articles had been published in Neue Freie Presse and Reichpost, the Coalition sued the historian for slander. After some hesitation, the trial finally took place in Vienna. and the witnesses were the very same Serbian politicians from Belgrade mentioned in the forged documents. It was proven that the papers were not conspiratorial documents, but merely low-quality forgeries.

Serbia and Montenegro: Reaction to Annexation

The annexation violated the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, but It was carried out in agreement with Russia. Russia agreed upon the annexation for the sake of insecure guarantees for free navigation through the Straits. It was a skilfull diplomatic victory of Aehrenthal over Isvolsky, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Isvolsky explained to the Serbian ambassador to Paris, M. Vesnić: “You, Serbs, could not even dream of chasing Austria-Hungary by arms out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And we, the Russians, on the other hand, cannot wage wars with them for these provinces. By this step Austria-Hungary does not gain anything in fact. On the contrary, it loses an established estate by renouncing the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and leaving it [to Ottomans]: thus it raises the spirit of the Serbian people, for it opens the chances of proximity between Serbia and Montenegro. This concession will occur on our request […] It will be followed by the revision of the Treaty of Berlin, on our request, and on that occasion Serbia could request the rectification of its borders […] In the year 1878 Austria accused Russia, now we shall accuse them.”⁵⁴ The plan of Isvolsky to summon an international conference on the revision of the Treaty of Berlin (Art 25 regulated the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina) was soon abandoned, after the negative reaction from Vienna and Berlin, and only the idea of territorial compensation for Serbia in Sanjak, proposed by Foreign Minister Milovanović was retained.⁵⁵

The reaction in Serbia was unanimous and fervent. The diplomatic position of the Serbs at the moment was clearly stated in an interview given by Stojan Novaković (famous historian, leader of the Progressive Party) to Pester Lloyd: “The first impression about this event for the Balkan peoples is that it annihilated any faith they may have had in the justice of the European powers and the weight of international treaties and regulations […] Since in the press of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Hungary we are always treated with malevolence and arrogance, Messrs journalists rejoice if the news from Serbia smells of gunpowder. It seems as if in Vienna and Budapest it would be gladly accepted if we swallowed the bait, got broken by force and became powerless forever. But, it seems that the Austrian editors have forgotten that we also have a few friends. In Vienna and Budapest, Serbia and the Serbian people are too underestimated, and it is being forgotten that underestimation may sometimes be a very dangerous misconception.”⁵⁶

The public opinion was disposed towards a bellicose response to the challenge from Vienna. Units of volunteers were even formed, after the example of Garibaldi’s brigades; in Belgrade and the other cities of Serbia Austro-Hungarian flags were burned in protest. The Austro-Hungarian envoy to Belgrade reported about the unanimous readiness for war. At the demonstrations in Belgrade, in front of 20.000 people who shouted: “To the Drina! War to Austria!”, the writer Branislav Nušić read the resolution in which it was stressed that: “Since Kosovo [meaning 1389] till this day, there has not been greater peril for the whole Serbian people and our homeland, as it is today […] The citizens of Belgrade, in the name of the whole Serbian natron, of- fer both their lives and their estates.”⁵⁷ The Serbian parliament passed the resolution, on October 12, against the annexation and emphasized that it supported the government and would approve of all the necessary measures. In Belgrade, on October 21, on the initiative of Nušić, a patriotic society “National Defence” (Narodna odbrana) was founded almost spontaneously. National Defense soon attracted many followers owing to its demands for a more active national policy, even a war to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within a month, some 220 committees were founded and instantly some 5.000 volunteers signed.⁵⁸ National Defense committeese were founded also in the provinces under the Ottoman and Habsburg rule. After the annexation had been recognized by Serbia, their activity was reduced to cultural and national propaganda. The prestige of National Defense, and especially the fear in Vienna of its conspiratorial role, were in inverse proportion to its mostly ceremonial activities up to 1909, when its revived activities were mainly reduced to the actions of the guerilla units (chetniks) in Old Serbia and Macedonia.

The wave of ardent protests against the annexation flooded Montenegro. It was considered that the annexation jeopardized the future of the entire Serbian nation, and that the survival of both Serbian states was made directly depending on the will of the hostile bureaucracy in Vienna. In Cetinje, before the legation of the Monarchy people cried “Down with Austria!”. In front of the Palace the demonstrators demanded that Prince Nikola must “lead them to the war for the Serbian lands and Serbian rights”. The Assembly of Montenegro adopted the resolution that the annexation “had inflicted a mortal blow to the interests of the whole Serbian nation”. Prince Nikola himself was overtly bellicose in his proclamation: “The black-and-yellow sign [the colors of Austro-Hungarian flag’ over the Serbian soil will not be the border that would in your mind and in your thoughts divide you from your kinsmen. On the contrary, this sign will be the obvious symbol of injustice: it will make the bonds even stronger, and will be the token of our everlasting trust in the victory of Justice.”⁵⁹ The annexation crisis put aside the old rivalry between the Serbian and the Montenegrin dynasties, which had been provoked in 1907 by an obscure affair. Namely, the Montenegrin students in Belgrade, manipulated by the Austro-Hungarian agents, were being encouraged to carry out a coup against Prince Nikola as an absolutist who refused to give way to the democratic institutions. Right after the annexation crisis broke out, the tense relations between Serbia and Montenegro were normalized and the diplomatic and military missions were exchanged. A motion was accepted to establish a Serbian-Montenegrin alliance, including the joint defence in the case of war with Dual Monarchy.⁶⁰

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the events resulting from the annexation were received in a seemingly passive way. According to the reports of local officials, the news of the annexation was received both by the Serbs and the Muslims with feelings of discouragement (mederschlagend). It was recorded that the discontent in the provinces was
increasing and that “almost the entire population sided with Serbia”. According to Russian sources four-fifth of population was against annexation.⁶¹ The Sarajevo garrison was alerted and 29 fresh battalions were brought (30.000 soldiers). Eleven special “flying squads” were formed of Muslim and Croatian volunteers for the guerilla combat against the Serbs. By the end of March 1909, all the preparations for the war against Serbia had been completed.⁶² The followers of extreme nationalist Pure Party Rights (Čista stranka prava) in Zagreb failed to form a Croatian National Legion for the war with Serbia. “Croatian national ustashi” were mentioned for the first time. Emperor Franz Joseph rejected the request of his General Staff to send an ultimatum to Serbia before declaring war.

The reaction of the Serbs to the annexation took various forms: group of peasants crossed from Herzegovina to Montenegro, willing to fight in the case of war, and a larger group of young men from Bosnia came to Serbia with similar intentions. It was for the first time after 1882 that the Bosnian Serbs manifested their readiness for armed resistance against the Monarchy.⁶³

Lacking external support, Serbia together WIth Montenegro tried futilely to internationalize the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stojan Novaković went to Constantinople in order to define with the Grand Vizier the conditions of joint resistance to the annexation. However, he failed to conclude the expected military convention. The negotiations in Salonika between the emissaries of National Defence and the leadership of the Young Turks on the common strategy in case of
war also failed. Nikola Pašić and the Crown Prince Djordje (who abdicated for personal reasons in 1909) were sent to St. Petersburg to seek the support of Emperor Nicholas II. Pašić was considered to be the only Serbian politician enjoying the unlimited confidence of the Russian government. On November 10, 1908, the Russian Emperor told Pašić that his sympathies are with Serbia, “because our [Slavic] cause is just”, but he nevertheless suggested “an agreement with Turkey and
preferably with Bulgaria, calm conduct, military preparations and waiting”, because Russia was not prepared for war. The Balkan alliance, including Turkey, was offered as an ideal solution for the future. The Emperor’s promise that he would not recognize the annexation encouraged the emissaries from Serbia, as well as the Duma (Russian Parliament) and the public opinion in Russia. The famous Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy,⁶⁴ among a number of other writers and internationally renowned Russians, wrote a series of open letters, demanding for a just solution to the Serbian question raised by the annexation.

The Foreign Minister of Serbia Milovan Milovanović tried to obtain the compensations in the Novi Pazar Sanjak and to avoid the European war. The request for compensations was not met with the expected response in France and Great Britain, although it did imply the recognition of the annexation. The Entente powers, although sympathetic to Serbia, avoided the very thought of entering a war with Austria-Hungary and Germany because of the Bosnian crisis. The Serbian public opinion, together with the leadership of the National Radical Party (Narodna radikalna stranka), the party of which Milovanović was a prominent member, was against the compensations. The Radicals thought that Europe should be put under pressure by the threat of war with Austria-Hungary. They considered that in accordance with
the principle of nationality autonomy should be sought for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the first step towards its final union with Serbia. The military occupation of the Novi Pazar Sanjak was proposed, which would thus place Europe in front of a fait accompli. The moment seemed favorable since Austria-Hungary was withdrawing its troops from the northern part of Sanjak according to an agreement with Constantinople. The final decision was, however, to accept moderate position. The military pressure on Serbia exerted by Dual Monarchy was constantly growing. As a minor incident at the border could lead to war, the Serbian government, expecting an invasion, transferred the state archives and the treasures of the National Bank into the interior of the country – to Niš. In February 1909, after repeated indications that war was possible, a government was formed under the presidency of Stojan Novaković, which comprised all the parliamentary parties (with the exception of the ephemere Socialists). The four-party government declared that it “retains the stance that the fullfilment of the vital Serbian needs and interests should be reached in a peaceful way and that, consequently, a competent decision of the great powers will be waited for, carefully avoiding anything that may lead to a military conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary.⁶⁵ Serbia was advised by St. Petersburg to abandon all the requests for territorial compensation. The government of Montenegro was far less indulgent: Prince Nikola replied to Belgrade that “the demands for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina should never ever be given up”, and in a reply to the Russian court he stressed
that Montenegro did not recognize the annexation retaining the right to act independently from the decisions of the great powers.⁶⁶

Austria-Hungary achieved the recognition of the annexation with the decisive support from Germany. Although not informed about the preparations for the annexation, Germany promptly supported the action of its ally. German ultimatum to Russia of March 22, 1909, neutralized the European intervention. The other Entente powers were
unprepared for war: France was engaged in Morocco and hoped to prevent the rapprochement of Vienna and Berlin by recognizing the annexation; Great Britain remained an intermediary, calming down the tensions in Russian-Austrian and Austrian-Serbian relations. London merely advised that the document of Serbia’s recognition of the annexation should be composed in a milder form. The unconditional consent of Serbia was also forced by the overt war threat. Austria-Hungary sent 1.041.000 soldiers to the borders with Serbia and Montenegro.

The Serbian resistance was crushed, seemingly forever, by the Russian consent. The Serbian government had to give in: on March 31, 1909 a declaration was composed in Vienna and sent to Belgrade to be signed, stating that “the new situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not encroach on the rights of Serbia”.⁶⁷ Every thought of compensations (territorial or railway link to the Adriatic Sea, corridor to the sea via eastern Bosnia) became impossible.

The Annexation revived the old Serbo-Croat conflict as to the identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Contrary to the idea of the Yugoslav unity and the historical closeness between Croats and Serbs, the Croatian historiography was submitting “historical evidence” to the Croatian character of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the fact that the
Catholics in these provinces, a small minority, did not develop a distinct national consciousness at the time the occupation took place. The clerical circles in Croatia considered the Bosnian Muslims as a part of the Croatian population, and Stjepan Radić even went to Russia lecturing about the Croatian “right” to the provinces.⁶⁸ The Croatian historian Ferdo Šišic published a treatise emphasizing that “the Hungarian claims on a direct annexation of Herzeg-Bosnia to Hungary are completely groundless. If such an importance is given to the historical rights, then the Croatian ones are undoubtedly the most respectable.”⁶⁹

The national movements in the Slavic South increasingly troubled Vienna, since the Serbs in Bosnia, along the Military Frontier, and in Herzegovina, were impatiently waiting for further developments. The annexation stirred and strengthened both the Serbian and the Yugoslav movements. Repressive measures against the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia were multiplied. The Serbian movement in Bosnia was compelled to moderation, and due to the reopening of the agrarian question, the alliance with Muslim organizations was reduced to a cold mutual tolerance. The governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, General M. Varešanin, considered the most important was to “make the Kingdom of Serbia dependent on the Monarchy, to bring it into the relation similar to the one of Bavaria to Germany”.⁷⁰ For the pro-Yugoslav youth of Bosnia, Bogdan Žerajić, a student who, on the day the Bosnian Assembly was opened, failed to kill General Varešanin and then committed suicide, became the model of national sacrifice. His example meant a lot to the youth gathered in various revolutionary organizations, formed after the model of Mazzinis “Young Italy”. “Young Bosnia” (Mlada Bosna) was among the numerous organizations inspired by the revolutionary struggle against the state-sponsored terror. It assembled the Serbs, but also Muslims and Croats of pro-Serbian or Yugoslavist orientation. It was in its ranks that the future assassin Gavrilo Princip was maturing.

The members of the Young Bosnia (formed around 1910), mainly high-school and university students educated on the Russian anarchistic literature (Bakunin, Chernishevsky, Lavrov, Gorky, and even Nietzsche), decided to respond to the political violence of the Monarchy by revolutionary means, speeding up the process of the national unification. Relations were established with a clandestine organization of army officers “Unification or Death” (Ujedinjenje ili smrt) – populary called the “Black Hand” (Crna ruka) , which took over the network of the National Defence committees in Bosnia soon after it was founded in Belgrade in 1911.⁷¹

The motives for a radical solution were numerous. From the annexation to the outbreak of the Great War, 148 trials were held against the Serbs charged with subversive actions against the sovereignty of the Monarchy. The most numerous (60) were the trials in Banja Luka, then in Tuzla (40), 20 in Mostar, 13 in Travnik, 8 in Sarajevo, and 7 in Bihac.⁷² The political trials affected above all the inteligentsia and citizens. Only few thousands of solved cases out of 56.000 lawsuits against serfs provoked fresh discontent among the peasantry. Even the most moderate Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina rose against complete repression symbolized by the fabricated political trials. The Serbian 20th Annual Assembly (June 12, 1913) addressed a complaint to the authorities that their “cultural institutions are being broken down over night”.

The Serbs were additionally homogenized by the Croato-Muslim pact reached in 1911-1912 on the initiative of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The way the new coalition functioned was best manifested in the work of the Bosnian assembly: “The Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot work from the moment the Muslim-Croat pact was established and ‘the Serbian hegemony’ ended. Inactivity of the Assembly is not as much conditioned by the pact itself as by its underlying intentions […]. It was meant to put an end to the hegemony of the Serbs, as Dr. Sunarić stated in public, and as a consequence, the activities of the Assembly were reduced to a minimum. […] As long as the blade of the Muslim-Croat pact, pointed against the Serbs, remains sharp, as long as the only reason for this pact is to keep the Serbs under pressure, the Assembly will live a dull life, from one crisis into another.”⁷³

The Challenge of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)

The outcome of the First Balkan War, that marked the end of the cooperation between the Serbs and Muslims (the latter taking sides with the defeated Ottomans), was a great challenge to the policy of Austria-Hungary. The unexpected victory of the Balkan Alliance and the rapid collapse of Turkey were seen in Vienna as the announcement of the forthcoming collapse of Dual Monarchy. When the Serbian army reached the Adriatic Sea – in spite of the efforts the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had made to prevent it – the Serbs from Herzegovina and Bosnia gave a public statement in Bosnian Assembly which was taken in Vienna as a dangerous manifestation of subversive activities: “The unparalelled sacrifices and grand victories of the Serbian army and the highly developed cultural life in the Kingdom of Serbia give a full right to the Kingdom to take over the ancient Serbian lands, which spread all the way to the Adriatic coast. The diplomatic attitude of Austria-Hungary – which is claiming the autonomous rights for the uncultivated Albanians, although it denies them to the South Slavs in its own state, who is trying to forbid Serbia to enjoy the fruits of its own
victories – causes the greatest discontent among all layers of the Serbian society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By expressing the feelings of brotherhood and admiration for the kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro, the members of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina perform their sacred duty, convinced that thereby they truly convey the feelings of all the Serbian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁷⁴

This is what one of the Bosnian Serb leaders, Vasilj Grdjić, wrote: “In comparison to the events that are occurring in the Balkans, the actual situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of minor importance. We all can feel it: both the Serbs, who have no other wish but to see the Serbian kingdoms enlarged, strengthened, powerful, and their adversaries, who are doing their best to underestimate the Serbian people and disdain the victories of the Serbian army, the adversaries who are unanimously trying to work out a state for the Albanians. Hrvatski dnevnik (The Croatian Daily) has assumed the leading part. The time will come when the Croatian people will be ashamed of having had such shameless sons who rose against their brothers in favour of the Albanians and their protectors, just as every decent Croat is ashamed now of the way the Hrvatski dnevnik is writing.⁷⁵

The attitude of the Bosnian Muslims toward the Serbs and Serbia also changed. For the Muslim masses, the Serbs have become ‘the greatest foe’, almost exclusively because the Serbs “are presently at war with Turkey, seizing its lands and being its enemy … The Muslim masses put all their hopes in Turkey, all their sympathies lie with Turkey. They love or hate whoever is Turkey’s friend or enemy.” In gen- eral, their survival or fall, just as their faith in Islam, is tied up with the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁶ During the crisis that broke out over Albania in 1912-1913, about 190.000 Austro-Hungarian troops were concentrated in Bosnia, including a considerable number of soldiers mobilized in Bosnia itself. In Sarajevo the brochure of Leopold Mandl on “Austria-Hungary and Serbia after the Balkan War” was considered as a political programme of the Dual Monarchy’s attitude towards Serbia.

These texts against the Serbs, these slanders had to produce the consequences. And though we are living in the age of constitution, the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been exposed, since the outbreak of the [Balkan’ war, to unceassing persecutions of various kinds which are much worse than those in the worst days of Kallay’s rule. The “traitors” have been found everywhere. Many were arrested and still are in prison in Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Mostar and elsewhere. Raids in search for the weapons have been made everywhere. Nor even have the churches been spared desecration. Fines have been imposedupon many and many have been arrested for the most innocent doings. The Serbian newspapers as well as those of the opposition have been seized as in pre-constitution times. This is what the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is going through.⁷⁷

The sudden strengthening and territorial enlargement of Serbia revived in Vienna the idea of “a preventive war”,⁷⁸ but the public opinion throughout Europe considered it impossible to contest the war victory of the Balkan Alliance. The German emperor Wilhelm II stressed the fact himself, by stopping Austria-Hungary from setting onto the war-path. Among the Bosnian youth, not only Serbs, the expectations rose, sometimes even at the verge of exaltation. A Serbian youth newspaper wrote in 1913: “Serbia honorably and courageously made a step towards the Serbian unification. Now, it has to get strength, stand up and refresh, for still numerous are the great deeds ahead”.⁷⁹

Certain measures of the Austro-Hungarian authorities provoked additional tension. Revokement of the post of civil adlatus in 1912 was an introduction into “the emergency measures” (Ausnahmsverfugung), for all the power was now laid in the hands of a military governor who was considered as the head of the provinces. This man, Oscar von Potiorek, was no longer responsible to the Common Ministry of Finance, but to the War Ministry in Vienna. When every illusion of a civil state disappeared, a group of the most moderate Serbs led by Gligorije Jeftanović left the Bosnian Assembly, a body with quite limited power. They were replaced with the so-called “loyal Serbs”, led by Dando Dimović, whose influence among the people was almost nil. During the period from the introduction of the emergency measures in May 1913 (motivated by the Scutari crisis and the threat of Austria-Hungary to enter a war with Serbia and Montenegro) to the assassination in Sarajevo in June 1914, Potiorek tried to organize another series of trials for high treason in Bijeljina, Foča and Banja Luka.⁸⁰ All sorts of organizations were put under a ban, musical and sport associations, as well as religious and educational. Out of 710 associations in Bosnia considered to be entirely controlled by the Serbs (396 Serbian, 230 of mixed membership), the majority bore the brunt. One of the participants in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand considered that their action was a logical reaction to the “emergency measures”.⁸¹

УВОД У САРАЈЕВО: СРПСКО ПИТАЊЕ У БОСНИ И ХЕРЦЕГОВИНИ (1878-1914)

Резиме

Српско питање у Боспи и Херцеговипи. од окупације 1878. до избијања светског рата 1914, било је у владајућим круговима Аустроугарске доживљавано као једна од главних препрека стабилизовању њене репресивне, полуколонијалне и антидемократске управе. У политици систематског потискивања Срба, Двојна монархија је завела низ мера ради сузбијања њиховог националног осећања – од ограничавања црквено-школске аутономије и верских прогона до ускраћивања политиких права и порицања постојања српског идентитета памстањем новог “босанског” као заједничког обрасца за стварање нове “босанске нације”. Без активне подршке из Србије п Црпе Горе све до анексије 1908, босански и херцетовачки Срби су на серије притисака и прогона окупационих власти одговорили борбом за национална права која се одвијала у три сукцесивне фазе: борбом за верску и црквено-школску аутономију, политичким организовањем и културним уздизањем и на крају, револуционарним активностима и терористичким акцијама. Читав покрет добио је снажан замах и широку подршку у народу захваљујући политици окупациопих власти. а затим и исрсшеном аграрном питању које је борби за национална права давало спажну социјалну димензију. После узастопних неуспеха да се сукоб превлада, однос Срба према властима Двојнс монархије, посебно после репресивлих мера уведених пакоп апексије и увођења вапрелног стања после Балканских ратова, неминовно је водно у сксплозиван сукоб у којем ће се сукобити Аустро-Угарска и Србија. Сам атентат у Сарајеву 1914, доживљаван је као логична реакција на ванредно стање, укидање српских институција и серију велеиздајничких процеса против омладинских и патриотских друштава.

1. M. Ekrnecic, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-19 78, Sarajevo 1960, p. 231. ↩︎
2. B. E. Schmidt, The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909, Cambridge University Press 1937: idem., The Coming of the TVar, vol. L London- New York 1930, p. 108: J. S. Ewart, The Roots and Causes of the War (1914-1918), vol.Il, New York 1925, p 948. ↩︎
3. Cf. G. Jakšić, Bosnia i Hercegovina na Berlinskom kongresu 1878. SAN, Beograd, 1956. Cf. also, M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, London-New York 1966, pp. 214-219. ↩︎
4. K.Karpat, “The Ottoman Empire Towards the Resistance of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Austrian Occupation”. in: Otpor austrougarskoj okupaciji godine u Bosni i Hercegovini, ANU BiH, Posebna izdanja, knj. XLIII, Odjeljenje društvenih nauka, knj. 8 Sarajevo 1979, pp. 155-163. ↩︎
5. Cf. D. Berić, “Pogled na literaturu o otporu austrougarskoj okupaciji IR78 u Bosni i Hercegovini”. in: Otpor austrougarsko] okupaciji 1878. godine u Bosni i Hercegovini, pp. 335-385. ↩︎
6. S. Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića. vol. L Beograd 193 L p. 77. ↩︎
7. Cf. P.F. Sugar The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1918. Seattle Reviewed bv M. Ekmečić in: Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, No 3. Belgrade 1964, pp. 120-124. ↩︎
8. Bericht uber die Verwaltung von Bosnien und Hercegovina 1913, Wien 1913; Dj. Pejanović, Stanovnistvo Bosne i Hercegovine, SAN, Beograd 1955, pp. 40-46. On schools: Dj. Pejanović, Stanovnistvo, školstvo i pismenost u krajevima bivše Bosne i Hercegovine , Sarajevo 1939, p 12. According to the Austrian military sources, in 1865 there was 47,76 percent of the Orthodox Serbs, 34,60 percent of the Muslims, and 15,98 percent of the Roman Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the borders of the vilayet of Bosnia there was 51,25 percent of Orthodox Serbs. 32,83 percent of Muslims and 14,25 percent of Roman Catholics. The official Ottoman census of 1871 revealed that Muslims became relative majority due to huge emigration of Muslims from Serbia to Bosma after 1867. Cf. Dj. Pejanović. Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 31-36. . ↩︎
9. M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Hercegovini i istorijske pouke, Prilozi XVIII, No 14. Sarajevo 19R2, pp. 32-35 ↩︎
10. Ministere des Affaire Etrangeres (MAE.), Paris, Correspondance politique ct consulaire. Turquie-Sarajevo. vol. 13, f. 478. Sarajevo. 20. juillet 1883. ↩︎
11. Haus, Hof und Staatsarchiv, Wien. Politisches Archiv, Berichte und Wiesungen. K 177. No 63, 3.10.1868, Cf A. Radenić, “Planovl Austro-Ugarske prema Srbiji u vezi sa aneksijom Bosne i Hercegovine”, Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat. SANU. Pos izdanja, knj. CDXVI. Odeljenje društvenih nauka, knj 61. Beograd 1969, p. 79 ↩︎
12. V. Popović, “Kalajeva ideja o pokatoličavanju bosanskih muslimana”, Politika, ‘Uskršnji broj’ (The Christmas issue) Beograd 1940. ↩︎
13. “Bosanska vila”. No 14, July 31, Sarajevo 1900, p. 197. ↩︎
14. J. Roskiewicz. Studien uber Bosnien und die Herzegowina, Leipzig-Wien 1868. pp 77-78. Roskiewicz was an intelligence officer in the Austrian consulate in
    Sarajevo ↩︎
15. C. Grubler. Mohhammedanismus, Panslavismus lind Byzantinismus. Leipzig 1877, p. 62. ↩︎
16. A. Strausz, Bosnien. Land und Leute, vol. I Wien 1882, p. 183. ↩︎
17. Cf T. Kraljačić, Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini 1882-1903, Sarajevo 1987, pp. 99-103. 125-12 ↩︎
18. Cf. Balan. Katolička crkva i Sloveni u Bugarskoj, Srbiji, Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo 1885. ↩︎
19. Arhiv BiH. Sarajevo, Fond Zemaljske vlade. No 1627, res/1908. ↩︎
20. The report of the Russian consul from Sarajevo of November 12, 1880, quoted in: Istorija srpskog naroda. vol. VI-I, Beograd 1983, pr. 612-613. (M. Ekmečić) ↩︎
21. Istorija srpskog naroda. vol VI-I, p. 613-614 (M. Ekmečić) ↩︎
22. Cf. B. Madžar. Pokret Srba Bosne i Hercegovina za vjersko-prosvjetnu autonomiju; Sarajevo 1982, pp. 263-274 ↩︎
23. Quoted in: P. Slijepčević (ed.), Napor Bosne i Hercegovine za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje, Sarajevo 1929, pp. 82-83. ↩︎
24. Ibid., p. 88. ↩︎
25. L. Lamuch, La Bosnie a la veille et au lendemain de f ‘annexion. Angers 1911. pp. 16-20. ↩︎
26. Quoted from the Serbian translation: Albert Male. Bosna i Hercegovina. Delo vol. XIV. 1897. Beograd. p. 339 ↩︎
27. “Politicko-prosvetne prilike u Bosni i Hercegovini”, Delo, vol. XVI, Belgrade 1897, pp. 530-531. Another Bosnian Serb recorded that he was given thefollowing reply when he introduced himself as the Orthodox Serb to an ober-lieutenant of the Austro-Hungarian army: “What Serb! We shall not shed our blood in this country for you to call yourselves the Serbs, never! The only Serbs are those that are born in Serbia.” Describing the Austro-Hungarian policy of de-Serbization, an anonymous Bosnian Serb emphasized: “We will not and cannot contemplate here the reasons and political calculations which made the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy use all the means right from the start in order to force a nation to renounce its name, its nationality, to force us to renounce the Serbdom, our Serbian name and nationality […] Were these measures in the best interest of the European civilization and progress? Is it the renouncement of one’s own nationality that the highly praised European civilization imposes to a nation as a condition for becoming civilized? It is those who signed the mandate given to Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina that are obliged to answer these questions.” Describing the methods of Kallay’s rule, he added: “The competence of the Serbian Orthodox communes was gradually reduced, some of their activities being put under the control of the state. The government started the newspapers ‘Bošnjak’ [The Bosnian] with the purpose of propagating the alleged ‘Bosnian’ nationality. Some of the members of the communes were deliberately persecuted and financially ruined by the government, whereas the others were favoured in order to excite envy among them. As the members of the city communes were mostly tradesmen, and the trade being exclusively in the hands of our tradesmen, systematic efforts were made to take over the trading business and confer it upon the foreigners. […] in order to keep our nation in the dark and deprived of any spiritual nourishment, not only the Serbian newspapers were banned, but the books as well, and those which were spared were looked upon with an evil eye, whereas the books issued by the [Rome-seated Croatian] ‘Sv. Jeronim’ [‘Society of St. Hieronimus’] and ‘Matica Hrvatska'[‘The Croatian matrix’] were forcibly imposed upon us.” (Ibid., pp. 513-514). ↩︎
28. V. Skarić, O. Hadži Nurić, N. Stojanović, op.cit. p. 96. ↩︎
29. On development of the Muslim movement cf R. Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle. The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878-1914, Boulder Colorado 1981. ↩︎
30. The report from Sarajevo of January 24, 1897. quoted in: Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. VI-1, Beograd 1983, p. 622. ↩︎
31. E. Anrich, Die jugoslawische frage 1870-1914, Stuttgart 1931, p. 48. ↩︎
32. T. Kraljačić, op. cit. , pp. 503-506 ↩︎
33. H. Kapidžić, “Agrarno pitanje u Bosni i Hercegovini za vrijeme austruugarske vladavine”, in: Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, pp. 331-335. ↩︎
34. T. Kraljačić, loc. cit ↩︎
35. J. M. Baernreither, Fragmente eines politischen Tagebuches. Die Sudslawische Frage und Osterreich-Ungarn vor dem Weltkrieg, Berlin 1928. Quoted in: N. Stojanović, Bosanska kriza 1908-1914, Sarajevo 1958, p. 21. ↩︎
36. “Pregled”, vol XIV (3,1912), March 15, Sarajevo 1912, p. 138. ↩︎
37. All statistical data are quoted from: Dj. Pejanović, Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, Beograd 1955. ↩︎
38. Documents diplomatiques francais, 2e serie, vol. IlI Paris 1911, p. 85 ↩︎
39. “Osterreichische Rundschau”. Wien, vol. XIII. 1907, p. 199. ↩︎
40. “Hrvatski dnevnik” No 168 (1906). Sarajevo; No 147 (1907) Cf. V. Ćorovlć. Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp.188-190. ↩︎
41. “I. Basic principles: Each nation has the right of self-determination. In the state the will of the people must be considered as the source of authority. The main condition of progress of the state is the versatile growth of all ranks. The religious differences do not impede whatsoever the union of the national interests. The culturally and economically strong man is a precondition of a free man. and a free man is the sole sound base of a free state. II. State: Bosnia and Herzegovina are the constitutive part of the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary governs it on baSIS of the mandate of the European powers. III. State organization: 1. The complete autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2. The exercise of the legislative and contol of power by a popular representative expressed bv general, direct, equal and secret vote. The government is the expression of the Parliament” (Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom, pp. 115-116). ↩︎
42. “Srpska riječ”, March 14 (27), Sarajevo 1908. ↩︎
43. A. Mitrović, Prodor na Balkan. Srbija u palnovima Austro-Ugarske i Nernacke 1908-1918, Beograd 1981, pp. 68-76. ↩︎
44. D. Djordjević. Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 1906-1911. lstorijski institut. Beograd 1962, ↩︎
45. Large diplomatic evaluation in M. Nintchich. La crise bosniaque (1908-1909) et les puissances europeennes, 2 vols. Paris, 1937 ↩︎
46. Ostcrreich-Ungarns Aussenpoiitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, vol. I, Wien 1930. pp. 2-3 ↩︎
47. Arhiv Hrvatske, Zagreb, Predsednički spisi Zemaljske vlade, 1908, fasc. 704. ↩︎
48. G. Nastitsch, Finale, Budapest 1908. ↩︎
49. R. M. Grujić, Apologija srpskog naroda u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji, Novi Sad 1909; Lj. Kovačević, Srbi u Hrvatskoj i veleizdajnička parnica 1909, Beograd 1909. ↩︎
50. T.G. Masaryk, Der Agramer Hochveratsprozess und die Annexion von Bosnien und Herzegovina, Wien 1909. ↩︎
51. Brzopisna izvješća XXXXI zasjedanja Pokrajinskog sabora Dalmatinskog, Zadar 1909, September 29, 1909. ↩︎
52. M. Polit-Desančić, Besede, vol. II, Novi Sad 1922, pp. 63-80. ↩︎
53. Le proces d’Agram et lopinion europe ene, Paris 1909. Cf. Scotus Viator, (R.Seaton-Watson), Die Sudslavische Frage im Habsburger Reiche, Berlin 1913. pp. 201 passim: M.Gross, “Hrvatska uoci aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine”, in: Istorija XX veka, vol III, Beograd 1962, pp. 192 passim. ↩︎
54. V. Ćorović. Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, Beograd 1936, pp. 221-222; D.C.B. Lieven. Russia and the Origins of the First World War, New York 1983. pp 33-36 ↩︎
55. Cf. D. Popović. Izvoljski i Erenta. Diplomatske uspomene iz aneksione krize. Beograd 1927; W.M. Calgarea, lswolsky und Aerhrenthal vor Bosnisclie Annexionkrise. Russische und Osterreich-Ungarische Balkonpolitik. 1906-1908. Uppsala 1955 ↩︎
56. “Pester Lloyd”. Budapest October 10, 1910. The geopolitical and demographic aspects of the Annexation were analyzed in J. Cvijic, The Annexation of Bosnia
    and Herzegovina and the Serb problem. Translated from Serbian by I. J.Christitch, London, Horace Cox 1909, 38 p. + map. It was an abridged version of Serbian original (62 pages) published in Belgrade in 1908, and also in French: L ‘annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine et la question serbe. Paris, Hachette 1909. ↩︎
57. J. Milićević, “Javnost Beograda prema aneksiji Bosne i Hercegovine”, in: Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, pp. 555-556; M. Nintchitch, op.cit., vol I pp. 211-220. ↩︎
58. The goals of “National defense” were: 1) To strengthen, encourage and enhance national spirit; 2) to gather volunteers; 3) to form volunteering troops and prepare
    them for armed actions; 4) to collect contributions, money and other means for realizing its aims: 5) to organize, furnish and exercise special insurgent troops (komite) aimed at special autonomous actions; 6) to enhance action in all directions of defence of the Serbian nation” (Narodna odbrana, Beograd 1910, pp. 6-7). The preparations of volunteers went on until March 1909, when Serbia officially recognized the annexation. In the board of Narodna odbrana were general Boža
    Janković, the leader of the Independent Radical Partv (Samostalna radikalna stranka) Ljubornir Davidović. Branislav Nušić himself and the other esteemed politicians and public servants. ↩︎
59. N.S. Martinović, “Otpor naroda u Crnoj Gori aneksiji”, in: Jugoslovenskt narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, p. 503: On Montenegro cf. J.D. Treadway, The Falcon &
    the Eagle. Montenegro end Austria-Hungary, 1908- 1911. West Lafayette, Indian 1983, pp.22-39. ↩︎
60. M. Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, vol. II, Beograd 1989, pp.605-612 ↩︎
61. B. Pavićević (ed.), Rusija i aneksiona kriza 1908-1909, CANU, Titograd 1984, docs. No 393, 408. ↩︎
62. K.B. Vynogradov, Bosnyski krizis 1908-1909, Leningrad 1964, pp. 124-126. ↩︎
63. Volunteers from Bosnia, mainly the Serbs, later joined the chetnik actions in Macedonia. Cf. N.Stojanović, op.cit., p. 63. ↩︎
64. L Tolstoy, O prisajedinjenju Bosne i Hercegovine Austriji, Beograd, S.B. Cvijanović 1909 ↩︎
65. V. Ćorović, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, p. 290. ↩︎
66. Cf. large documentation in: B. Pavicevic (ed.), op. cit., docs. No 346, 350, 375-376. ↩︎
67. The text of the Serbian note in the French original was :”Se referant a la note anterieure du Gouvemement Serbe au Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois et de facon
    a dissiper tout malentendu qui pourrait en etre Ie resultat, le Ministre de Serbie a recu I’ ordre de foumir les explications suivantes au Mimstere Imperial et Royal des Affaires Etrangeres: La Serbie reconnait quellc ri’a pas ete atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Herzcgovinc et qu elle se confonnera par consequanr atelle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport al article XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances la
    Serbie sengagc des a present a abandonner I’attitude de protestation et d’opposition quelle a observee a regard de lannexion depuis I’auturnne demier et s’engage en outre a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l’Autriche-Hongrie, pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied d’un bon voisinage. Confcrmement a ces declarations et confiante dans les intetntions pacifiques de l’Autriche-Hongrie Ia Serbie rarmenera son armee, a l’etat du printemps de 1918, en ce qui concerne son organisation, sa dislocation et son effectif. Elle desarmera et licenciera ses volontaires et ses bandes, et elle empechera la formation des nouvelles unites irregulieres sur son territoire.” ↩︎
68. S. Radić, Živo hrvatsko pravo na Bosnu i Hercegovina, Zagreb 1908; Radić stressed that “Bosnia and Herzegovina must become a constitutive part of the united Croatia (p. 59). Radić’s book provoked the reaction of the famous Slavist P. Lavrov. Aneksia Bosnii i Gercegovinii i otnoshenie k nei slavianstva, St. Petersburg. 1909. pp 123-140. ↩︎
69. F. Šišić, Herceg-Bosna prigodom aneksije. Geografsko-etnografsko-historična i državnopravna razmatranja, Zagreb 1908. A historian from Belgrade University Stanoje Stanojević, instantly replied to Šišić: “Otvoreno pismo g. Dr. Ferdu Šišiću, profesoru hrvatske istorije na Zagrebackom univerzitetu”, Politika, Belgrade, December 23, 1908. ↩︎
70. Quoted in I. Kršnjavi, Iza kulisa hrvatske politike, vol II, Zagreb 1986, p. 582. ↩︎
71. Cf D. Ljubibratić, Mlada Bosna i Sarajevski atentat, Sarajevo 1964, V. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, Beograd 1964, pp. 436-540 (In the second, enlarged edition in 1978, two volumes, like in the first edition, there is more elaborated analysis than in the English abridged version of the first edition, The Road to Sarajevo, London 1966). ↩︎
72. Dj.Mikić, “Veleizdajnički procesi u austrougarskoj politici u Bosni i Hercegovini”, in: Veleizdajnički proces u Banjaluci, Banjaluka 1987, p. 55. ↩︎
73. In “Pregled”, vol XII (I, 1912), January 1 1912, Sarajevo 1912. p36. ↩︎
74. Quoted in: V. Skarić, O. Hadži-Nurić, N. Stojanović, op.cit., pp. 146-147. ↩︎
75. “Srpska riječ” , January 10, Sarajevo 1913. ↩︎
76. Further analysis in: M. Ekmečić, “Impact of the Balkan Wars on Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in: B. K. Kiraly and D. Djordjević (eds.), East Central
    European Society and the Balkan Wars, Boulder Colorado 1987, pp. 26-285. ↩︎
77. “Pregled”, vol. XX-XXXI, Sarajevo 1913, pp. 544-555. ↩︎
78. The Austro-Hungarian head-of-staff General Conrad von Hotzendorf disclosed the suggestion in a memorandum submitted to the Emperor delivered on January 20, 1913, about the preventive war for the renewal of the prestige of the Monarchy, endangered by the creation of the independent “Greater Serbia” and offered the following explanation: “1. The Slavs in the Monarchy, and especially the Yugoslavs, will search for support from the new state, a protege of Russia. The Serbs from the Monarchy will especially tend to associate with it. In that way, the Monarchy is in danger of losing the most important domains for its position as a great power and for its economic development, especially its coastal possessions along with its coastal importance. 2. The independent Serbia, merged with Montenegro, presents a respectable military force. 3. The renewed esteem of Serbia inflicted a mighty blow to the morale of the Monarchy, not only in the Balkans, in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, in its own domains, but also in the eyes of the world. This blow significantly reduced the importance of the Monarchy as an ally, and consequently its political and economic value. We should not keep delusions, in spite of our so-called diplomatic success […] 4. This reduction of esteem bears effect on all the patriots, especially in the army” (Feldmarschal Conrad, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Wien 1923, vol. III, pp. 12-16). ↩︎
79. Quoted in: V. Ćorović, Istorija Srba, vol. III, Beograd 1989. ↩︎
80. Dj. Mikić, op.cit., pp.51-68. ↩︎
81. V. Bogićević, Sarajevski atentat. Stenogram glavne rasprave, Sarajevo 1985, p. 133. Cf standard pro-Austrian explanation: J. Remak, “1914: The Third Balkan War – Origins Reconsidered”, Journal of Modem History, vol. 43 (1971), pp. 353-366. Cf also a more balanced approach by Z.A.B. Zeman, “The Balkans and the Coming of War”, in: R.J.W. Evans and H. Pogge von Strandmann, The Coming of the First Word War, Oxford 1991, pp. 19-32 ↩︎