This discussion was published in Serbian in 1908, during the Annexation Crisis, and shortly thereafter in French, Russian, and Czech, with excerpts published in English. All editions of this brochure were banned in Austria-Hungary.
Introduction
In recent decades, there has been no event that has caused as much unrest among the Balkan nations and states, particularly and primarily within the Serbian nation, as the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary carried out unilaterally at the end of September this year. This act destroys faith in the value of international treaties, demonstrating that small countries like Serbia and Montenegro, which are not only economically nearly stifled but also politically unsecured. It visibly offends the principle of nationality, as it definitively places a central part of the Serbian nation, already divided under the administration of seven different whether states or administrations, under foreign control. Furthermore, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina made the severe national-political position of the Serbo-Croatian people, who number around ten million, clear to broader layers of society and presented their national issue in sharp relief. Finally, a deep sentiment has taken root that significant events are approaching for the Serbo-Croatian people, which perhaps can only be postponed for a while.
Geographical and Economic Position of Serbia
In a very important and challenging geographical position, a new small political territory, the Principality of Serbia, a vassal of Turkey, was formed in the early decades of the last century. It occupied a central position in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula, through which the most important communication artery of the Peninsula, the Morava-Vardar line, passes, connecting Central Europe with Turkey, Asia Minor, and later with the Suez Canal. The terrain of Serbia is inclined from south to north, with all major rivers flowing in that direction and their valleys open towards the Danube. Therefore, Serbia was geographically more Danubian than a Balkan country; due to its central position and the Morava Valley, it was also an important transit country between Central and Western Europe and the Near East.
Vassal Serbia was open to the Austrian Monarchy and was commercially oriented towards it. Its economic ties with Austria-Hungary were neither hindered nor prevented at that time. Additionally, Serbia, as part of the vast Turkish Empire, maintained active trade relations with other parts of the empire. Therefore, it had free economic and commercial movement in all directions. Through Turkish Bosnia and Herzegovina, traders drove livestock and grains to the Adriatic coast, especially to Dubrovnik. Among the routes that connected Serbia to the Adriatic Sea, of particular significance was the old trade road that led from Mokra Gora through Foča and Bileća. Using this route, it was possible to reach the Adriatic coast with livestock from the Serbian border at Mokra Gora in four to five days.
Since the Congress of Berlin, Serbia’s position, although it became an independent kingdom, has become incomparably more difficult. This is partly because it became independent and a designated center and focal point of the Serbian people. Since this congress, Serbia’s position has been such that Austria-Hungary has had the ability to prevent or deprive Serbia of the conditions for true economic and cultural development, and, without formally annexing Serbian territory, turn it into its economic and political vassal. Therefore, at the Congress of Berlin, Serbia’s geographical and economic position was significantly altered to its detriment.
As a political-territorial outcome of this congress, the following ideas and facts emerged: only the interests of the great powers were considered; the small Balkan states gained territory to a greater or lesser extent only through these interests and the influence of those great powers most interested in their territories. Furthermore, the creation of a continuous chain of Slavic states in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula was prevented by giving the mandate to Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, one great power, initially temporarily, and now, after the annexation, permanently, became a Balkan state.
Under the influence of these ideas, and due to the latest territorial changes, Serbia and Montenegro have been territorially disfigured and economically bound. Neither gained even as much territory as their armies had conquered and held before the Congress of Berlin. Not only was it prevented that these two small states should be territorially united, but a narrow political territory was formed between them, which was given the name of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Additionally, to ensure greater security that Serbia and Montenegro would not unite, not only were Turkish administration and military present, but Austrian garrisons as well. Serbia received unnatural geographical, ethnographic, and political borders. Not only did it not obtain access to the Adriatic Sea, to the shores of which simple Serbian folk lived, but it did not control any of its export routes either. While before the Treaty of Berlin it bordered Austria-Hungary only along its northern boundary, after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it also bordered it in the west. For political reasons, Austria-Hungary almost hermetically sealed Serbia’s western border immediately following the Congress of Berlin. Serbia lost the old trade route from Mokra Gora through Foča to Dubrovnik, which previously provided a free passage to the Adriatic Sea. All of Serbia’s borders and all communication routes through which it could economically and commercially connect with Central and Western Europe were closed by Austria-Hungary. Except for these boundaries, Serbia was left with only two highly circuitous routes through which, in case of great necessity, it could connect economically and commercially with the world that consumes its agricultural and livestock products. These routes were: one down the Danube to the ports of the Black Sea, and the other from Vranje through Thessaloniki to Mediterranean, especially Italian markets. But on the first, more important export route, one encounters high tolls for passing ships through the Iron Gates, which again stem from the Treaty of Berlin, and on the second, even greater difficulties exist. I will elaborate on both later. Thus, it was achieved that after the Congress of Berlin, Serbia was economically completely closed off and could have only as much economic and political autonomy as would please its greatest neighbor, the Dual Monarchy, under which the largest part of the Serbo-Croatian populace lived and which was a constant political opponent of Serbia. There is no state in Europe that had such a poor economic position marked by the characteristics Serbia was given at the Congress of Berlin. After this congress, Serbia became almost a besieged country, and we became an imprisoned people.
Exhausted from two wars waged with Turkey before the Congress of Berlin, defeated by the outcomes of this congress and influenced by generally unfavourable political circumstances, the so-called independent Kingdom of Serbia fell under the economic, and subsequently political, influence of Austria-Hungary after the Congress of Berlin. It practically became its vassal. A favourable trade agreement was concluded with Austria-Hungary, which seemed like the first stage towards a customs union, and Serbia’s entire economic life became firmly tied to the Dual Monarchy; exports were seemingly directed primarily to Budapest and Vienna, but in reality, most of them merely passed through Austria-Hungary and moved towards Antwerp, Rotterdam, and German ports. A military convention was also concluded with Austria-Hungary, according to which Serbia renounced all national endeavours and any connections with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia’s entire political life fell under the almost exclusive influence of Austria-Hungary; moreover, it even incited many internal political events. It seemed that the ideas of those great powers, which were the most powerful at the Congress of Berlin and believed that Serbia would become only an economic-political vassal of Austria-Hungary, had been realised.
Under that influence, Serbia remained until the last 10-12 years. Almost the entire population in Serbia was most decisively opposed to the new economic and political vassalage, and, not recognizing the difficult geographical and economic position of Serbia after the Congress of Berlin, attributed all these events solely to the dynasty and considered them merely as a necessity of the dynasty and dynastic politics. Governing in Serbia was arduous, and severe internal events occurred. In addition, individuals and parties, unsettled due to such a state, and lacking sufficient moral and social discipline, engaged in bitter internal struggles en masse. Our country provides a classic example of how a poor geographical and economic position can provoke internal anarchy. Nevertheless, there is one benefit that Serbia had in the first years after the Congress of Berlin: by having a favourable trade agreement with Austria-Hungary and establishing the aforementioned political relationship with this monarchy, it was as if in some political shelter and still culturally and economically progressed; during this time, a significant number of important cultural achievements were created.
New generations have arrived, and there are still individuals whose morale was not broken by earlier events. New energies have emerged, and at the same time, there are determined first steps towards emancipation from Austria-Hungary. This movement particularly strengthened in the past 4-5 years. Whereas 10-12 years ago Austria-Hungary rarely hindered Serbian exports and did not close the northern border of Serbia, the only economic gateway for Serbia after the Congress of Berlin, it began prohibiting the export of pigs and cattle over the past 10-12 years. Livestock diseases are cited as the reason, which have become more frequent since the aspirations for emancipation from Austria-Hungary began. However, it is not only by these means that Austria-Hungary has deepened the existing antagonism between itself and Serbia. It seems that the clerical Dual Monarchy has a particular ability to skillfully identify itself with every unpopular current. Long disliked by popular groups in Serbia, it has also been hostile towards Serbian parliamentarism.
In order to free itself from economic and political dependence, Serbia made a tremendous effort and, contrary to its gravity and the hopelessness of its geographical position, entered into an economic and customs war with Austria-Hungary, which lasted two and a half years.1 And only in August this year was a trade agreement concluded between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, but of such little value that the economic war continues to some extent latently. During the customs war, it was shown that significant obstacles were placed against Serbia’s exports both down the Danube and towards Thessaloniki.
Serbia exports three main types of products: raw and dried fruits (especially dried plums), grains, and livestock (especially cattle and pigs), and recently also quite a bit of poultry.
After the declaration of the customs war, dried plums and grains could primarily be transported down the Danube to Braila and Galați, from where they were further distributed through the Black Sea, Bosphorus, and Dardanelles. This export encountered the mentioned high taxes at the Iron Gates. According to the Treaty of Berlin, Austria gained the right to regulate the Iron Gates and transferred this right to Hungary at the cost of internal compensations, in which, as is well known, these countries are inexhaustible. Hungary poorly executed the regulation of the Iron Gates and subsequently imposed high taxes for the passage of ships through the Iron Gates, significantly hindering navigation on the lower Danube for all other countries. I cannot delve longer into the first purely technical issue. Technical experts judge it very unfavorably.2 The current practice has sufficiently established that the regulation of the Iron Gates has brought very little benefit to navigation; the primary gain is that navigation can be conducted on more days of the year than before the regulation. Very high taxes are paid for the passage of ships through the poorly regulated Iron Gates from Moldova3 to Turnu Severin, a distance of 104 km. These taxes were encountered by the export of grains and dried plums from Serbia during the customs war, causing significant losses to Serbian producers and traders.
It was even more difficult with the export of live cattle. Since all borders with Austro-Hungary were closed, with the old road through Foča and Bileća closed much earlier, right after the Congress of Berlin, the cattle had to be transported solely by railway to Thessaloniki, and from there by ship to Egypt, Malta, and especially to Italian markets, where it would arrive after 10-27 days. Additionally, the railway from the Serbian border to Thessaloniki, through Turkish territory, was in the hands of Austrian capitalists and under Austrian administration, making transport fees very expensive. Ultimately, Serbian export was only possible along this route as long as we maintained friendly relations with Turkey. The cost of transporting one head of cattle from Serbia to Genoa, including all expenses, was 55-60 dinars. For the processing of pork into preserves, slaughterhouses existed, particularly a modern one near Belgrade, equipped in the American way, and the preserves were exported in various directions, primarily to France.
Ultimately, there were significant difficulties with the export of fresh fruit as well, and it had to be sold at a pittance at the beginning of the customs war.
Serbia, therefore, was economically confined like in a mousetrap by the provisions and consequences of the Treaty of Berlin and left at the mercy and adversity of the Dual Monarchy. With the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a position of Serbia was definitively fixed.
The recent acts by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria completely destroyed the temporary order and fragile balance created by the Treaty of Berlin, necessitating the establishment of a new territorial and economic order in this part of Europe. At the Congress of Berlin, a devastating geographical and economic position was imposed on Serbia, and Serbia must first, and rightfully so, seek to change this position in the new order in a way that would ensure at least the minimum conditions necessary for its survival and development. This would include Serbia acquiring a certain territorial zone in the Serbian people’s area, providing access to the Adriatic Sea.
In addition to economic danger, there is also a political threat to Serbia. Its small territory remains only for a time to act as a buffer between Austria-Hungary and the strengthened independent kingdom of Bulgaria, which is twice the size of Serbia. Such an economically suffocated political territory cannot sustain itself as independent for long. Once definitively established on the Balkan Peninsula, Austria-Hungary will continue its expansionist policy towards the south. It cannot tolerate a small Serbia on its southern border, which, by its mere existence, opposes it, and inevitably arouses the aspirations of the Serbo-Croatian people for national independence, making the position of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina perpetually insecure. The imperialistically inclined dynastic-military circles of Austria-Hungary are clear on this; discussions were conducted in Austrian military journals several years ago regarding the direction of further penetration towards the south, and it was determined that the path does not lead through the narrow Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which lies between Serbia and Montenegro and is barely passable for larger military expeditions due to its terrain, but rather through Serbia, primarily along the Morava Valley.
The danger to Serbia from Bulgaria is no less significant, especially if hostile actions against Serbia begin in agreement with Austria-Hungary. Informed circles are aware that Bulgaria has behaved hostilely towards Serbia over the past 2–3 years, seeking any pretext to declare war on Serbia on two occasions, thwarted only by the intervention of some great powers.
The Importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Serbian People
At the Congress of Berlin, when determining the borders of Serbia and Montenegro, neither territorial balance nor the minimum territory necessary for the survival of the two Serbian states was considered. These aspects are usually taken into account by even the most formalist diplomacy. Similarly, national balance and significant national rights, the natural rights of a people, were entirely neglected. I am not referring to the full realization of the principle of nationality and precise national demarcation of states. Such a method, conducted at a congress and for specific regions, might possibly provoke other national issues and well-known conflicts in Europe, related to peripheral areas and parts of individual nations. However, as an undeniable minimum of the principle of nationality, it must be upheld that the central region and core of a nation should not be given to a foreigner, to a foreign state, because Bosnia and Herzegovina represent that for the Serbian people. Therefore, they are not to Serbian and Montenegrin people what Alsace and Lorraine are to the French, or what Trento and Trieste are to the Italians, or what the Alpine Austrian areas are to Germany, but they are what the Moscow region is to Russia, or what the most solid parts of Germany and France are to these two nations—in other words, those parts that are the best representatives of the German and French races. To not unify Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia and Montenegro, or at least not give them autonomous governance, but to hand them over to Austria-Hungary, means creating a fragile balance, a hellish state that brings no peace to either the conqueror or the national claimant, and against which all the living forces of a nation are in constant turmoil. Such combinations are the greatest nonsense; they not only fail to ensure peace but are a perpetual source of unrest and danger to peace, particularly akin to a barrel of gunpowder placed next to a large fire, which licks it from all sides.
And although it is widely known that Bosnia and Herzegovina are regions of purely Serbian race, I will briefly present their position and significance for the Serbian people.
Serbia and Montenegro are small areas of crystallization, where not even one-third of the population speaking the Serbo-Croatian language is gathered.
The result of this calculation is this: Our language’s people number around ten million. In terms of numbers, it is the third-largest among the Slavs, right after the Russians and the Poles. From the German border to Constantinople, there is no larger nation than ours. Therefore, it is larger than the Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks. Our nation’s annual growth is about 100,000; it is either comparable to or greater than the surrounding nations and ranks among the nations with the highest growth rates. In that large complex or ethnographic area of the Serbian nation, Bosnia and Herzegovina occupy a central position.
All this mass of ten million people speaks a single language that is as simple as few others in Europe. From Istria deep into Macedonia, peasants can understand each other. Moreover, it is known to Slavic scholars and language experts that there is no national language on the Balkan Peninsula that is so well-formed and perfected for literature and science as the Serbian language.
The first literary monument of the Serbian language appeared in Bosnia in 1189, known as the Charter of Ban Kulin. The most beautiful folk creations were made in the regions of Herzegovina and Bosnia. The language of Herzegovina was chosen by the founder of the Serbian literary language and modern Serbian literature, Vuk Karadžić, as the literary language of the Serbian people. This same language was adopted as the literary language of the Croats in the first half of the 19th century.4 Many of the most deserving people of the Serbian nation originate from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several of today’s best Serbian writers, whose works are distributed and valued throughout the entire Serbian nation, are Herzegovinians and Bosnians. Every scientific endeavor in Belgrade finds the most enthusiastic collaborators in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding the unity of the Serbian nation and its national aspirations, all Serbian journalism shares the same views, and Serbian journalism from Bosnia and Herzegovina leads in certain respects. Despite all the obstacles that are constantly put in place, the literary and scientific connections between Belgrade on one side and Mostar, Sarajevo, and Banja Luka on the other side have remained alive and intimate.
The people of the marked territory are not bound only by the same language and literature. In a greater part of this geographic area, there exists a Serbian national feeling and thought, which is as strong in the broad population as in any other Balkan nation. Through common historical traditions, it is evident that the people and the higher societal life are composed not only of living personalities but also of the deceased and past events. And although there are regional differences, the basic psychological traits of the people throughout the entire marked region are the same — those creative characteristics of the national spirit that manifest in everything: from the motifs in ornamentation and the way buildings and tools are constructed to the outlook on life, to the total of feelings, superstitions, and imaginations that people use to account for the world and life. In this regard, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent one of the most ethnographically vibrant and strongest parts of the Serbian nation and form an inseparable entity with the people of western Serbia, the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, and Montenegro. When crossing from the Montenegrin Highlands5 into Herzegovina, no difference in the people is noticeable. Similarly, when crossing from the border regions of Serbia into Bosnia or the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Almost the entire population of western Serbia originates from Herzegovina, Bosnia, and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.
The trade not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in neighbouring regions, including western Serbia, is primarily in the hands of people from Herzegovina. Nowhere else is the loyalty and dedication to the cultural and educational interests of the Serbian people more developed than in Herzegovina and Bosnia. Furthermore, Bosnians and Herzegovinians participated in significant numbers in all the wars that Serbia fought in the 19th century for its liberation and the liberation of neighbouring areas. Even during the Turkish period, before the occupation, they built a large number of their churches, schools, and founded other educational and cultural institutions, and they continued this work after the occupation; now, they independently support their schools and teachers and make significant endowments for economic and educational purposes. They have their own educational organisation, which has considerable resources for educating talented young people at universities.
Heading from Serbia towards the west, one first encounters a Catholic population in central Bosnia that speaks the Serbian language. The border between the predominantly Orthodox and the mixed Orthodox-Catholic population generally follows the watershed between the Drina and Bosna rivers. Until the occupation, the Catholic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina felt united with the Orthodox population. Intermixed with the predominant Orthodox population, it lies between Croatia, which is majority Catholic, and Serbia, along with eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are exclusively Orthodox. From these parts of Bosnia, it is thus possible to significantly influence the reconciliation of differences created by different historical developments between the western and eastern parts of the same nation, and to merge them even more firmly into a single cultural entity than is currently the case. This is easier and more feasible given that the majority of Croats and Serbs in Croatia have shown not only an awareness of the need for mutual tolerance but also the capability and perspicacity to work jointly. The spirit and purpose of the Austrian occupation administration were entirely contrary to this: it separated and distanced these national segments, as will be seen from the following chapter.
From the above, it is clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to the value of its people, its central position within the ethnographic mass of the Serbo-Croatian people, and its convenient mixture of Orthodox and Catholics, is the key to the Serbian problem. Without them, there cannot be a larger Serbian state. They are the most important region for resolving the Serbo-Croatian and thereby the Yugoslav question.
The Spirit and Purpose of Austro-Hungarian Rule in Bosnia
Austria-Hungary is a state of a single dynasty. Its territorial policy is likewise primarily the policy of the dynasty. The moment it loses sovereignty over one region, it immediately persistently seeks to expand its sovereignty over any other region where it is momentarily easiest, where there is the least resistance. This is not the policy of a great state organism, which, full of strength and life, deliberately occupies the region that it truly needs. No, Austrian territorial policy is illogical, mediaeval in its main characteristic.
From such motives, and due to particular circumstances, she received the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Congress of Berlin. She would not have been able to obtain this without the strong assistance provided by Germany and England, especially the former, for whom the occupation of Bosnia appeared to strengthen German ambitions and policies. The conquest of these Serbian lands was not a necessity for the broad social strata of Austria-Hungary; neither various economic classes nor industrial and mercantile sectors desired it. Only the dynasty and the court-military faction desired this. The fact that a slight majority of the parliament gave its consent after the accomplished act should not surprise those who know the limited value of this body in Austria-Hungary, especially regarding foreign affairs; on the contrary, those familiar with Austrian circumstances were surprised that it was not accepted unanimously.
It is understandable that such an illogical and unnatural policy of conquest could hardly fulfill any of the promises made at the Congress of Berlin as the reason for occupation. The main reason was that Dalmatia needed a hinterland to connect with via communications. As the great powers paid little heed to the aspirations of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this could have been a reason for them. But Austria-Hungary did not fulfill this promise. For 30 years, it failed to connect the occupied lands with Dalmatia by rail; these lands remained foreign to each other as they were before the occupation. Moreover, not only up to the Congress of Berlin but even to this day, Dalmatia has remained one of the economically most backward regions, and this is acknowledged by the Austrians themselves in parliament, in journalism, in brochures. Further reasons for the occupation were these: Austria-Hungary, as a state of considerable means, could resolve the agrarian question and could bring peace and order among the people of various faiths, among Christians and Muslims, who were at odds with each other. And while Serbia and Bulgaria, which had similar agrarian conditions, completely solved the agrarian question immediately after the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary alone did not resolve it. Not only did it fail to bring peace and order among people of various faiths and denominations, but it also exacerbated these conflicts.
As it could not fulfil the aforementioned tasks, it likewise could not bring true culture and peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy primarily carries with it a certain, specifically Austrian spirit of administration and clerical-Catholic aspirations. This is particularly felt in its external efforts in the Balkans, especially in the occupied territories.
Under the Austrian spirit of governance, I mean the well-known dry Austrian administration, followed by strict police order. This is the most complete regime of tutelage, mastered to virtuosity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and possibly the last example of the old police state. The authorities regulated everything, instructed everything, and meddled in everything, killing all personal initiative as much as possible. The well-known Austrian Beamter, who are very courteous and helpful to foreigners, regard Bosnians and Herzegovinians as savages, look down on them (von oben herab), and think they have come to make them happy in their own way and according to their own schemes. There is no doubt that they introduce a certain police order and those cultural innovations that cater to small human needs. But the Austrian administration did not know—nor can it know—the true feelings and logic of this people, who are completely foreign to them. Except for a few Bosnians and Herzegovinians who have become officials, almost none of the numerous foreign officials truly understand the native language, full of imagery, that peasants often use to conceal the deep differences in understanding between themselves and the Austrian administration, to mock it, and to mark their hostility. Most of those from the central Sarajevo administration, who think they know the native language, speak in some barely comprehensible jargon of the Serbian language, so it is actually easier to communicate with them in German or to mix many German words to be understood. Such governance, which tutors and decrees from above, could not possibly start working from below, from the people, to teach them to rise by themselves. Neither did they understand the people, nor did the people understand them. This complete lack of understanding and miscommunication is the cause of many comical scenes that provoke hearty laughter in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Bosnian-Herzegovinian writers have become very popular by depicting this dissonance between the people and the administration, particularly the gifted Kočić, who is currently in prison because of it.6
The patronising administration in question is distrustful towards the populace, suspects everyone, constantly spies, and there are places, fortunately rare, where nearly a third of the population is engaged in espionage. It possesses a whole system of minor means through which it intimidates, pressures, pricks, and kills any free movement, often driving individuals and specific groups to despair. As a true occupying administration, which arrived by command, by the mandate of Europe, not out of some necessity, it does not care to elevate the population to a higher level and thus bring them closer to itself and win them over. Therefore, the people consider this administration an enemy and mostly deeply hate it. The Austrian occupying administration has a special skill for nurturing deep hatred among its subjects. This hatred is so strong that they transfer it to the population of free Balkan states, where it is understandably less developed, because this population has not felt the heavy regime of the police state; they only feel the other inconveniences that emerge in the relations between their states and Austria-Hungary, and that is still less severe. Because of such popular sentiment, there is no other area in the world with relatively so much gendarmerie and military to guard the people, and so many fortifications to intimidate the populace, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An English politician who travelled through Bosnia and Herzegovina three years ago shared this instructive comparison with me: Austria-Hungary has used more military resources to keep the subjugated people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbering 1.5 million, than England in India, which has nearly 300 million inhabitants.
Amid general distrust, the Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterised by a Catholic-clerical spirit and ambitions. It cultivates, develops, and exploits minor disputes and seeds of religious intolerance to create hostilities between confessions and to be able to use one against the other. Due to the absolutist-clerical spirit, education and the general cultural level of the broad population are very neglected.
According to official data from 1906, there are only 253 state elementary schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in addition to 70 maintained by Orthodox church communities and 31 maintained by Catholic communities. In Serbia, there are 1,272 elementary schools. In just four districts annexed to Serbia after the Congress of Berlin, there are 227 elementary schools, almost as many as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is five times larger than those four districts. In the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and the rest of Old Serbia, which are under Turkey and significantly smaller than Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are about 240 Serbian schools. The large number of schools in Macedonia belonging to Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian ethnicities is also well known. Regarding the number of schools, Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot only be compared with Serbia, but they also lag significantly behind Old Serbia and Macedonia. By many subtle means, the Bosnian administration hinders the establishment and operation of Orthodox elementary schools.
The same relationship remains when comparing the number of teachers and the budgets of primary and other schools. In Serbia, there are 2,375 teachers, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 810, out of which more than 200 are paid by church school municipalities. Serbia annually spends 4,577,110 dinars on primary schools, while Bosnia and Herzegovina spend 1,264,540 crowns on them. Bosnia and Herzegovina have three state gymnasiums and one real school, while Serbia has 20 gymnasiums and real schools, out of which 10 are complete, and the others have 4-7 grades. Only in the mentioned four districts, which Serbia received after the Congress of Berlin, there are four gymnasiums and real schools. Furthermore, Serbia has 4 teacher training schools, 4 trade, agricultural, and viticulture schools, and 3 schools for the higher education of girls; then there is the University with 80 teachers and about 1000 students. Serbia spends over 2.5 million dinars on secondary and specialised schools and the University. Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have a University, and less than half of what Serbia spends is allocated to secondary and specialised schools.
The schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not only aim to provide scientific and useful knowledge and to raise the level of general enlightenment. In the complaints submitted by the Orthodox and Muslims to the Austro-Hungarian Emperor and the joint Minister of Finance,7 numerous pieces of evidence were presented: that the teaching of subjects is adjusted according to the aims of the Bosnian administration, that Catholics disproportionately prevail in the teaching staff, and that Catholic students are favoured in various ways, while obstacles are created, especially for Orthodox students. And this is solely for the principle: divide et impera. Undoubtedly, through school, especially secondary school textbooks, the Serbian national language of Bosnia and Herzegovina is being corrupted. I can confirm this myself: due to the distorted language, I could barely understand certain parts of those textbooks.
The administration with a clerical-Catholic spirit is not and cannot be impartial towards the various Bosnian religions. There is probably not a single peasant in Bosnia and Herzegovina who has not felt that the state administration has a poor attitude towards the Orthodox Church. The officials of the central administration in Sarajevo are Catholics, almost exclusively of lower education, and this alone is enough to instil distrust in everyone. Immediately after the occupation, clear tendencies to disorganise the Orthodox Church were felt. The Austrian Emperor took upon himself the right to appoint Orthodox metropolitans. The regional administration in Sarajevo strongly influences the appointment of priests not only through the metropolitans appointed by the Emperor but also by assessing the capability of the priests themselves, taking into account their national and political behaviour. This is detailed in three memorandums submitted to the Austrian Emperor by Orthodox communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, disproportionately less has been done to improve the economic condition of the broad masses compared to Serbia.
It was mentioned that the agrarian question has not been resolved. The largest portion of the rural population still consists of serfs who do not own any land. According to official statistics, there are:
| Large landowners | Free peasants (owning land) | Serfs (owning no land) | Demi-serfs (semi-free peasants) |
| 2.13 % | 33.45 % | 38.25 % | 11.26 % |
Serfs pay the beys according to the rule of 1/3, and to the state 1/10 of the land’s yield. Therefore, the complete Turkish agrarian system has been retained, the one that last regulated the relationship between beys and serfs in 1859. However, while in Turkish times the tithe was collected in kind, it is now converted into money, often at a price that exceeds the market value. Minor officials, tithers who assess the tithe, receive a certain percentage from it. The larger the tithe, the greater the tithers’ reward. According to the assessment of the tithe, which is almost always higher than it should be, the bey or aga demands their one-third. Furthermore, the assessments of the tithe are also irregular because they are carried out at the discretion of minor uneducated officials, often driven by religious hatred. This last irregularity has also been pointed out by J. M. Baernreither. It is well known how much such a mediaeval system of possession and taxation hinders human activity and poses a significant barrier to the wider population’s material well-being. But, where the level of enlightenment is as low as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, neither the free nor the semi-free peasants are significantly better off materially than the serfs. Despite this, all the taxes that usually exist in other European countries have been introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
After the occupation, feverish work began on exploiting Bosnian forests, and every year tens of millions of crowns worth of timber and lumber are exported; in 1907, 28 million of it was exported. I am not well acquainted with the forestry economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it seems that this is not a rational exploitation of the forests, considering that even after thirty years of exploitation, 28 million crowns worth of timber and lumber are still being exported annually. When such a large quantity of timber is exported every year, is it possible to reforest so much cleared land? There are significant mining enterprises, particularly iron, manganese, and coal mines, as well as industrial enterprises. These businesses are undertaken by individual firms from Austria-Hungary, and they operate as if in colonies, where work is poorly done, exploitative, with the highest possible profit. The workers are mostly brought in from outside. The local population has not been involved even in the kinds of work they know how to do or could get accustomed to, and from this significant economic activity, they have not derived real benefits.
As in every country that has been liberated from Turkish rule, there has been progress in that many state buildings and government hotels (the latter being a specialty of the Bosnian administration) have been built. However, a disproportionately larger amount has been spent on military and police barracks and countless and varied fortifications, which cover the entire country like a network. A significant portion of the budget of Bosnia and Herzegovina is spent on these recent works and on the numerous gendarmes, which the administration, like the army, has to maintain for its own security.
The most praised results of the Austro-Hungarian administration are personal and property security, and communications, especially railways. Indeed, there is a sufficient degree of common security for the lives and properties of individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, not only is personal freedom significantly restricted, but so is freedom of movement, particularly for those of Orthodox and Muslim faiths who have stronger national sentiments or are politically more active. They cannot move freely from place to place within Bosnia and Herzegovina, much less outside these regions. Due to the very extensive espionage network and inaccurate or false espionage reports, personal security is also highly limited and compromised. There are many unequal and suspicious citizens.
The administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown the greatest progress in building railways. It inherited from the Turkish administration only the Banja Luka—Doberlin line of 104 km of standard gauge. According to the 1906 report, the Bosnian administration built 1232,2 km of narrow-gauge railways in 30 years. After the publication of this report, the narrow-gauge railway from Sarajevo to the Serbian border at Vardište, 166 km long, was completed. Most of these railway lines, as stated in the report itself, were built for military needs, but they undoubtedly also benefit trade and the country’s economy. Some lines remained primarily strategic, such as the one from Metković to Zelenika in Boka Kotorska, and then the line from Sarajevo to Vardište.
Acknowledging this railway advancement, I must point out that it represents a general progress shown by all Balkan states after the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria, for example, has built more and more rational railways than Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia, which did not show significant progress in this regard initially, is now compensating for it and has built, after the Congress of Berlin, 558.8 km of standard gauge railways (1453 mm) which have only economic significance. All the railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina, built by Austria-Hungary, are narrow gauge. Therefore, Serbia’s standard gauge railways alone are more valuable than all the railways in Bosnia. Additionally, Serbia has built 270.3 km of narrow gauge railways (0.76 m) and is currently constructing 472.4 km of narrow gauge railways. Hence, Serbia has a total of 826.1 km of completed railways, and including those under construction, the total is 1298.5 km.
Recognising the advancements made by the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I must point out that they do not correspond in any measure to the reputation that has spread throughout Europe, especially in Western Europe. Through skillfully organised publicity in journalism and literature, these advancements have been exaggerated. It was claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina were more advanced than any other Balkan country and that Austria-Hungary had achieved a work of civilization here that has no equal. The Bosnian administration has raised publicity to the level of a state institution. No important tourist, especially a newspaper correspondent, could pass through Bosnia and Herzegovina without the knowledge of the Bosnian administration; each was met at the border and offered the services of specially trained officials of the Bosnian government, who would inform them about the country and its people in a certain way. Journalist congresses were organised with splendid receptions and free trips. With great effort, it was managed to convene international congresses in Sarajevo, such as archaeological ones or excursions of the Geological Congress. I know that members of this latter congress were received and splendidly entertained as nowhere else in Europe.
Still, in the promotional literature about Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are two types of writers. Some are those who praise the ruler and the administration, which have provided them with free rides on railways and often four-horse carriages, and supplied them with gifts. It is not worth delving further into this somewhat elite class of journalists and other writers. However, it is interesting for the morals of our era to note that such journalists and writers are quite numerous in Europe.
There are also a few honest writers who have been misled, and it seems to me because of the following reasons:
They did not know the Serbian language and hence did not come into contact with anyone except certain officials and particular people, who were trained on how to guide foreigners and what to show them.
They did not independently study official data deeply, especially Bosnian statistics, but out of human habit and laziness, they willingly accepted the data provided by the Bosnian government; and I know for certain that there isn’t a single significant traveller to whom they haven’t offered this data.
It seems that for the aforementioned respectable writers, this psychological aspect was of greater importance. From Western Europe, one can easily and swiftly reach Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the East, which is more picturesque than the lands of European Turkey. The astute administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina came up with the idea to introduce a unique institution not found anywhere else in Europe, so-called state-owned, clean, and well-maintained hotels, which can be found in all towns, and even in some villages. Travellers enjoy the extraordinary beauty of the land and an East more interesting than the East of European Turkey, while having all the comforts in these state hotels. This is the same feeling we have on the snowy and wild peaks of the Swiss Alps when we find the familiar Swiss hotels there, or the feeling one has when looking at interesting and dangerous animals in cages, without any danger and in complete comfort. And we are spontaneously grateful to the state administration for providing us with this pleasure.
There are very few writers who, beyond all the aforementioned skills, have seen the true situation, at least partially.
Serbian and Yugoslav Problem
Perhaps in Europe, there is no dividing line as stark as the one that separates the Serbian people on one side and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, or rather the remaining complex of Austro-Hungarian countries and peoples, on the other. Their feelings, opinions, and worldviews are different. It is so different that Austro-Hungary, despite centuries of contacts and connections, did not understand the feelings and logic of the Serbian people. And regarding what is happening in Serbia, it misunderstands everything and, fortunately, acts absurdly. This is evident in constant frictions, disagreements, and antagonism. I will not here detail that strange mixture of good and bad qualities that distinguish the Serbian people, which are the product of many factors such as patriarchal life, Eastern influences, Orthodox faith, and historical-political development; certainly, some of the original national traits are also present. But there exists a complex of strong characteristics that influence the relationship of the Serbian people towards Austro-Hungary and because of which they, even within the framework of the dualistic monarchy, stand out as a foreign body.
Each Austrian foreign action must contend with the resilience and strength of the Serbian people and their unbreakable desire for independence. It has been established that the Serbian language, in a free competition, conquers and spreads. The peculiar beauty of Serbian folk songs and the strength of historical traditions are well-known. These, along with Serbian melodies, have spread and conquered. The people possess a creative spirit and that spur of the spirit which encourages thought and leads to innovation. When it comes to national feelings and aspirations, their mutual support and resistance are very significant. Their instinct for independence is so strong that, in individuals, it sometimes appears antisocial. This is perhaps most strongly developed in the noble adversities of Montenegrins. The Serbs have always had their national ideals, and when they fell under foreign rule, they, as a national mass, were not in the service of the foreigner. Centuries of struggle with conquerors have nurtured national pride and national heroism in the Serbian people and have carried out a selection unlike that of any other Balkan nation. When they suffer national injustices, they feel something within them that is stronger than their strength and reasons that advise restraint. Moral motives, as a rule, prevail over material ones among the broader masses.
The Dual Monarchy does not understand this because it did not find this form among its other Slavic peoples. It exacerbated this antagonism through Catholicisation and Unionisation with Rome8 of entire regions and individuals in earlier times, then through numerous promises of autonomy, independence of the church, etc., which it made in times of need but never fulfilled; it provoked the greatest discontent among the broad masses by taking away the best lands for the state or for the settlement of colonists.
It is a very common case that a Serb and a true Austrian, discussing national policies and starting from the same premises, come to completely opposite conclusions. Serbs, with all their strength and being, represent true nationalism and the aspiration for their own and Yugoslav independence. A Yugoslav cultural and state community can only be created on a free national basis. For this reason, no foreign administration can find loyal subjects in the Serbian people. This profound psychological trait and the main political feature of the national soul is felt not only in Serbia, which was also under foreign and Austrian administrations, but likewise in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, etc. In the deepest layers of the people, there is not only distrust but often hatred, a deep, unrooted hatred towards the conqueror. The aspiration for independence has not been lost even among individuals who have nationally yielded. There are Serbs in Austro-Hungary who have risen to high state positions due to their personal merit and services. There are others who have achieved this or similar positions solely out of very common interests. Both work, of course, in an Austrian sense. But among the first, the more honourable, there is an internal struggle between the aforementioned deep psychological trait and the fact that, due to circumstances, they have reconciled with Austrian Yugoslav aspirations; they feel this reconciliation as a sin and often end their lives sadly due to internal and external conflicts. Even among those worst, who have surrendered to the foreign administration for gain, if you strip away all the corrupt layers, of which there may be many, at least a small healthy core of that deep Serbian feeling emerges, which burns the soul and gives it no peace.
The Orthodox Christians, therefore, are persistent and uncompromising representatives of the desire for independent national and cultural life, and the Orthodox faith is the label that best characterises these aspirations. However, they are not the only ones. These aspirations and viewpoints have advanced recently and are increasingly taking on a Yugoslav character, becoming a quest for the national and cultural independence and self-sufficiency of the southern Slavs. Now, Austria-Hungary can only partially use Yugoslav Catholics for its political purposes. In Dalmatia, many Catholics have always been strong advocates for national independence, just like the Orthodox; on multiple occasions, from Dalmatia, which is on the coast and whose inhabitants have a broader perspective influenced by national Italian culture, the most reasonable views supporting Serbian-Croatian national independence have emerged. It has been noted that in Croatia, Croats and Serbs have shown that they not only understand the urgent need to tolerate each other but also the capability to work together. They care about the people and national independence and culture, not about dynastic, clerical, and foreign interests. It appears that without violence, the old Austro-Hungarian policy can no longer be pursued even in Croatia.
There is thus a clearly expressed tendency for the entire Yugoslav complex from Trieste to Thessaloniki to form a single national entity and to develop culture on a national basis. Religious denominations are subordinated to the national principle. And the main mass of this Yugoslav complex is made up of the Serbian people, who, moreover, occupy the most favourable, but also the most difficult, geographical positions, lead the main struggle, and bear the main sacrifices for this idea.
According to those deep-seated feelings and the idea of national independence, the Austro-Hungarian conquest on the Balkan Peninsula has long emerged as an adversary. This began particularly in the 17th century and continues with varying success to this day. The Austro-Hungarian army reached Skopje and Kosovo and had to retreat; it occupied Serbia twice and had to abandon it; it conquered Dalmatia, Boka, and now Bosnia and Herzegovina. The basis of this Austro-Hungarian policy is as follows. The monarchy is surrounded on the north, east, and west by powerful states and nations, before whom it had to retreat and abandon their territories. If, now, for whatever motives, aspirations for an active foreign policy emerge within it, they must be directed toward the path of least resistance, to the south, into the region of the Serbian people. For a very long time, these motives were merely dynastic-military ambitions, and even now, they remain the main driver of Austrian conquering policies. In recent times, it has been almost bashfully emphasised that they need the Balkan regions for the stronger development of industry, which requires markets; as if the expansion of industry in Europe necessitates territorial conquests, and as if it couldn’t develop much better and more securely without the well-known resistance and hatred, which Austro-Hungary spreads throughout the Balkan Peninsula through its conquests! Furthermore, for a long time, Austro-Hungary enlisted certain Catholic Yugoslavs for its conquering plans by promising them the unification of Yugoslavs, of course with a clerical-Catholic label. Recently, before the annexation of Bosnia, it began to give promises that trialism would replace dualism in the monarchy, and that Yugoslavs would form the third autonomous unit. This last idea or promise is merely a means to counter Serbian-Croatian nationalism and the aspiration for Yugoslav independence, a means to facilitate or enable further conquests on the Balkan Peninsula.
It seems that the motives and ideas of today’s very active Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, about which Western European, particularly English writers maintain that its main outlines were given by the Austrian Heir Apparent, who found in today’s joint foreign minister a more zealous than prudent assistant. They believe that the recent actions regarding the Novi Pazar railway and the annexation of Bosnia are a return to the traditions of an energetic policy, which Andrássy, supported by Bismarck, led with much success at the Congress of Berlin. At that congress, Russia, despite having led a victorious war, was deprived of all the fruits of victory, while Austria-Hungary, without waging war, gained two substantial territories and saw even brighter prospects. Now, Russia is in a similar state, exhausted by the Japanese war and still unsettled internally; from these troubles in which Russia finds itself, every possible benefit should be gleaned. Austrian circles hold that Russia is a negligible quantity and will remain so for a long time. Therefore, they think that a bold policy can be pursued without any real risk. Austria has gained new strength, and a new brilliant era of the Dual Monarchy is beginning. Domestically, they rely chiefly on democratic clericalism, which is continuously strengthened. By supporting the proclamation of Bulgarian independence and the kingdom, Austria-Hungary did not do so out of love for strengthening Bulgaria, but rather as a measure against Serbia; it helps Bulgaria to more securely prevent the aspirations of Belgrade and Cetinje.
An English writer,9 whose thoughts are presented here, believes that Russia is not as weak as Austrian circles have assumed, and besides, it has allies. Moreover, this writer, with unusual intuition, sensed the importance of the Serbian people and the newer Yugoslav currents met by the Austro-Hungarian policy of conquest. It has taken to resolving the Serbian question, the most interesting, most complicated, and most dangerous part of the great Austrian question. Calchas rightly thinks that the South Slavs are the Achilles’ heel of Habsburg power.
There is another well-known cause, which almost unconsciously drives Austria-Hungary towards conquests on the Balkan Peninsula. Although Austrian circles undoubtedly think and wish to pursue their independent policy in the Balkans, they do so only to a certain extent. Regarding major trends and movements, they essentially must pursue the policies of Germanism and the German Empire. This must mechanically be the case. Austria has a large German nation and the powerful German Empire as its neighbour to the north and west, immense national and economic forces that push it southward. This is made all the easier as Austria is composed of many peoples, who are constantly at odds and fighting amongst themselves, with the German people being the most powerful within Austria itself, primarily giving the cultural and, in many ways, political character to the Dual Monarchy. And this aforementioned mission, which Germanism has imparted onto Austria-Hungary, consists of this: Austria-Hungary crushes the peoples who come under its authority; it incites conflicts among nations and parts of the same nation, weakens national feelings and instincts, and where possible, infiltrates them with Germans.
Such a policy by Austria-Hungary, with all the motives and means presented, has entered a phase of active engagement. It began with the construction of the Novi Pazar railway, followed by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, due to their position and the composition of their population, hold the key to solving the Serbian question. This marked the beginning of a decisive clash between the idea of Serbian-Croatian nationalism and independence on one side, and Austrian imperialist policy, which, in order to weaken the Yugoslavs and facilitate its expansion, promoted the idea of clerical-Catholic Yugoslavism.
All the severe events recently seen in the South Slavic regions are merely signs of the struggle between these two ideas. This group includes the tightening of the described unbearable regime in Bosnia, the creation of the “high treason” affair10 and the mass arrests of Serbs in Croatia, the use of all means to break the Serbian-Croatian coalition, the dissemination of the latest false news about Serbia, and more.11 This fatal struggle, in which individuals and families suffer, and which culturally harms not only the Serbian people first and foremost but also other South Slavs, as well as Austria-Hungary itself, has been ongoing for a long time. A significant portion of the Serbian people’s energy has long been tied up in this struggle, and the newer generations are primarily dedicating themselves to it. Very little national energy can be directed toward cultural work. The entire cultural development of an undoubtedly talented nation is constrained by the fight for an independent national-political existence.
The entirety of Austro-Hungary’s foreign action is connected to the Serbian people and the Serbian problem, although the haughty gentlemen of the monarchy would never admit it. This has not only continuously weakened the entire monarchy but also exposed it to the risk of triggering the so-called Austrian problem. It has already started to lose sympathies on all fronts because its imperialistic plans have become clear, and because of the demands it has made and continues to make, which are detested by the Serbian people and are distasteful to many other states and peoples: that Serbia and Montenegro must not be territorially united, and it has strived and continues to strive to prevent these small states from obtaining natural borders. In the areas of the Serbo-Croatian people that it controls, it is conducting a malicious job: it is fostering religious intolerance and alienating the two parts of the same people; this has led to exacerbations and even civil wars, such as the one in Zagreb in September 1902.12 The stronger its desires for conquering the Serbian people and territories, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina now, the greater the hatred it provokes against itself. Political subjugation and political pressure not only yield no benefits but cause damage in all directions—even creating obstacles and hindering its own exports. And if it ever happens to maintain or further conquer any land of the Serbian people, it could never win their loyalty. This violent occupation is worth little and does not last long; at least Austria has experience in this. Due to the presented deep psychological traits of the Serbian people and their indomitable desire for independence, there is no reconciliation or solution on that conquest basis. Even if it conquers the Serbian people, they will rise again at a favourable opportunity and establish their national state because of these characteristics. Austria-Hungary would be healthier and stronger if not only it ceased further aggressive attacks on the Serbian people but also separated from those parts it currently holds. The remaining large territory of the Dual Monarchy, with peoples who have grown accustomed to each other more or less, would remain peaceful and secure for cultural and economic work. The Serbian people, as a state unit, would enter into the most intimate cultural and economic connections with the Dual Monarchy, provided there are no intentions of conquest.
From the southern German border to Constantinople stretches an area of smaller nations, in contrast to the larger part of Russia, Central, and Western Europe, which are areas of large nations. In that region, there are no established states or fully-formed nations yet. Everything is in the process of being created, or is currently being created, and the aspirations of the Serbian people for national unity have taken a precise shape in all its parts. These ideas might not be easily stopped by any simple force other than that of Austria-Hungary, which itself must undergo new crises and processes, in addition to the ones it is currently experiencing. However, it is unlikely that the clerical-dynastic Austria-Hungary, with its well-known bureaucracy and dry police administration, will take humane and cultural paths, which I believe should be emphasised at the end of this discussion. Furthermore, it is well known that human nature often dictates that individuals or states see as a matter of honour what actually harms them the most. Therefore, the responsibility for the events that will ensue will fall solely on Austria-Hungary:
The Serbian problem must be resolved by force. Both Serbian states must be primarily prepared, both militarily and educationally, to maintain national energy in the conquered parts of the Serbian nation, and to seize the first favourable opportunity to address the Serbian question with Austria-Hungary.
- Tran. note: 1906-1908 “Pig War”. ↩︎
- C. V. Suppan, in the work “Wasserstrassen und Binnenschiffahrt,” 1902, Berlin, on p. 94. ↩︎
- Tran. note: Moldova Veche on the Danube, in Romania. ↩︎
- Tran. note: For more information, see the 1850 Vienna Literary Agreement. ↩︎
- Tran. note: The Highlands (Brda) also known as “Sedam Brda” (“The Seven Hills”) was a historic and geographic region in Montenegro, inhabited by the Serbian tribes Bjelopavlići, Bratonožići, Vasojevići, Kuči, Moračani, Piperi and Rovčani. In the XVII until mid-XVIII century, the official name of the country was “Montenegro and the Highlands”, as the Stara Crna Gora (Old Montenegro) or Istinska Crna Gora (True Montenegro) region consisted only of four districts adjacent to the Brda. ↩︎
- Tran. note: Petar Kočić, famed satirist, later a Member of Parliament in the only (1910) parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Habsburg rule. Noted for his satirical speeches in the Parliament. ↩︎
- Tran. note: The Joint Minister of Finance was also the governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ↩︎
- Tran. note: The Greek-Catholic wing of the Catholic Church was created through congregations being allowed to keep the Orthodox liturgy, but accepting the Pope as the head of their Church. The Habsburgs were actively involved in this process, conditioning aid during natural disasters on religious affiliation to varying degrees. ↩︎
- Calchas, The Problem of the Near East. The Fortnightly Review. London. November 1908. p. 735. ↩︎
- Tran. note: Reference to the 1908-1909. trial in Zagreb, where Austro-Hungarian authorities attempted to sentence 53 members of Srpska samostalna stranka (SSS – Independent Serbian Party) to break up the Serb-Croat Coalition which held a majority in the Croatian parliament. Even though the prosecution’s case was weak and most of the evidence inadmissible, as the main witness for the prosecution was a police agent provocateur, the 53 who were convicted to prison were only set free once the Coalition made a political alliance with Hungarian Prime Minister Héderváry. The backdrop of the trial was the Annexation Crisis of 1908 and the 53 were arrested on the same day that the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. The Austro-Hungarian authorities wanted to show that there existed a conspiracy between the SSS and Belgrade to justify the annexation. ↩︎
- André Cheradame particularly characterized this method and its results (L’Europe et la question d’Autriche. Paris. 1901. p.X): “These alterations of the truth, systematically continued over the years, produce extraordinary results.” ↩︎
- Tran. note: Mass riot of multiple thousands over several days, stoning and attacking Serb businesses and houses in Zagreb. Pacified after the military was brought in and mobile court martial were established. 103 convicted out of approximately 20 000 rioters. ↩︎
